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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
as the Juncker Commission delivered a “new start” for EU Justice and 
Home Affairs (JHA) policies? This book examines the question in 
relation to the performance of the European Commission’s intra-
institutional setting while taking stock of the most relevant legislative 
developments in JHA or the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) from 
2014 to 2018. 
The Juncker Commission has been dubbed a ‘Commission of crisis’. The 
set of policy priorities laid down in “A New Start for Europe”, the President’s 
2014 political guidelines, have been subject to various events framed as ‘crises’, 
which have sent political waves over the legitimacy and fundamentals of 
European integration in JHA. These have included the 2015 ‘European refugee 
humanitarian crisis’, the reintroduction of internal border controls in the 
Schengen area by a few member states, acts of terrorism in several European 
cities and some EU governments actively backsliding in terms of rule of law.  
Following the Introduction, Section 2 of the book examines the 
Commission’s new structure for JHA, and its intra-institutional configurations. 
For the first time this Commission included a First Vice-President responsible 
for Better Regulation, Inter-Institutional Relations, Rule of Law and the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, Frans Timmermans. He was entrusted with two 
main roles: first, as a ‘watchdog’ upholding the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and the rule of law principles envisaged in the Treaties and monitoring 
Better Regulation guidelines, across all the Commission’s activities; and second, 
coordinating the work of the three JHA-related Commissioners:  
 The Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, Věra 
Jourová, Directorate General for Justice and Consumers (DG JUST); 
 The Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris 
Avramopoulos, Directorate General Migration and Home Affairs (DG 
HOME);  
 The Commissioner for the Security Union, Julian King, also at DG HOME. 
The structuring of this Commission’s work on JHA into two DGs dealing 
with separately issues of ‘Justice’ and ‘Home Affairs’ has continued to prove a 
welcome division of responsibilities. However, the exact division of portfolios 
between all the relevant Commissioners has not always been clear or remained 
consistent. 
H
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Since the emergence of the ‘European refugee humanitarian crisis’ in 2015, 
the highest political instances inside the Commission took over most of the 
themes under the responsibility of each of the Commissioners for ‘Home Affairs 
and Migration’. This has meant the implementation of a ‘top-down approach’ in 
decision-shaping and making. The Commission President’s cabinet, and chiefly, 
First Vice-President Timmermans and the Vice-President of the Commission 
and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
(HR/VP), Federica Mogherini (European External Action Service, EEAS) have 
been in the driving seat in the Commission’s responses to the various ‘crises’. 
In practice this has meant that there has been not one, but many ‘Home 
Affairs’ Commissioners. The blurring of Commissioners/Vice-Presidents 
portfolios has generally played in favour of a home affairs and security approach 
prevailing among all relevant Commissioners and Vice-Presidents in areas such 
as migration, asylum and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. This has not 
always allowed for the prioritisation and development of other equally crucial 
policy approaches in sectors such as foreign affairs, development cooperation, 
humanitarian aid, trade, justice, employment and social affairs.  
The ‘Commission of crisis’ has put too much focus on border controls and 
prevention of entry, returns and readmission in cooperation with third countries 
on migration, countering migrant smuggling, building third country capacity 
for interception at sea and safeguarding internal security in its overall policy 
agenda. This has not always allowed the First Vice-President to rigorously fulfil 
its watchdog mandate in the setting and implementation of Commission policy 
priorities in view of their compatibility with and impact on the rule of law and 
fundamental rights, nor in respect of their added value, proportionality and 
necessity in view of EU Better Regulation guidelines. 
Section 3 of the book conducts a detailed examination of the most relevant 
legal and policy developments by the European Commission from mid-2014 to 
the end of 2018 in the following AFSJ fields: Schengen and securing borders; 
asylum and refugees; legal immigration; irregular entry and third-country 
cooperation on expulsions; criminal justice and police cooperation; and the rule 
of law and fundamental rights. Special attention is given to the Commission’s 
enactment of legal acts. These developments are critically assessed in view of 
rule of law, fundamental rights and Better Regulation guidelines, all 
corresponding to the First Vice-President of the Commission’s tasks and lying 
at the constitutive basis of the EU legal system. 
There are three main ‘policymaking logics’ at stake which summarise and 
describe the overall performance of the European Commission from mid-2014 
to the end of 2018 in relation to the AFSJ: Europeanisation; 
intergovernmentalism and rule of law backsliding; and informalisation and 
exceptionalism. 
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Europeanisation 
‘Crises’ have served as catalysts for the adoption of previously controversial and 
already existing, as well as some new, EU policy, legislative and institutional 
ideas by the Juncker Commission. They have provided the ground for the re-
design or creation of new Community bodies and EU agencies responsible for 
coordinating and supporting EU member states and with increasing operational 
tasks in JHA-related fields. The proposed and adopted reform of the Frontex 
Agency into a European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG), the creation – through 
enhanced cooperation – of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), a new 
mandate and a counter-terrorism centre at Europol, and an expanded role for 
the eu-LISA agency, constitute some cases in point. A key outstanding issue for 
these community bodies and agencies is that of democratic accountability and 
judicial control, and effective access to justice and independent complaint 
mechanisms when their activities impact on fundamental rights. 
The Commission has also actively contributed to the initiation and setting 
up of new EU harmonised legal standards. A key and most visible achievement 
of this Commission was the formal adoption and entry into force of the new EU 
data protection framework including the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), which is now a world-wide benchmark on privacy protection.  
In other areas, the Commission has presented some security or law 
enforcement-related initiatives in the fight against crime and terrorism whose 
EU value added, necessity, proportionality and fundamental rights compliance 
– according to the EU Better Regulation Guidelines – have not been sufficiently 
proven and independently assessed. These have included policy initiatives such 
as the ‘interoperability’ of EU databases, and the related new role attributed to 
the European Agency for the Operational Management of large-scale IT Systems 
in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA), as well as the 
presentation of European Production and Preservation Orders (EPO) and a 
proposal aimed at preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online.  
The area of asylum has been negatively affected by a home affairs and 
‘securitarian’ rationale. Some Commission proposals have aimed at reframing 
some already existing EU asylum instruments falling under the Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS) as migration and border management 
instruments. This has been the case for example with the idea to oblige all 
member states to use ‘safe third country’ notions that would require them to 
expel legitimate asylum seekers to countries outside the EU where their safety 
is not always guaranteed.  
This security rationale has also materialised in an increasing focus on 
conditionality in exchange of resettlement, or the increasing penalisation of 
asylum seekers who move to a second member state different from the one of 
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first irregular entry (so-called ‘secondary movements’), irrespective of the 
possibility of having legitimate reasons to do so such as degrading or inhuman 
reception conditions. 
Informalisation and Exceptionalism 
The refugee humanitarian crisis in EU countries such as Greece and Italy showed 
the limits and inherent flaws characterising the current distribution model 
envisaged in the 1990 EU Dublin system for assessing asylum applications, and 
on-the-ground weaknesses in reception conditions and judicial/administrative 
asylum structural capacities.  
As an ‘immediate policy response’ in 2015, based on the European Agenda 
on Migration, the Commission proposed an emergency temporary relocation 
mechanism establishing a distribution key model for relocating some asylum-
seekers (only those belonging to one of the eligible nationalities, mainly Syrians 
and Iraqis) from Italy and Greece to other EU member states, which has been the 
object of legal challenges before the Luxembourg Court and subject to serious 
implementation obstacles by some member states. 
This came alongside a ‘hotspot’ approach to assist authorities in Italy and 
Greece with the support of EU agencies like Frontex, the European Asylum 
Support Office (EASO), the EU Police Cooperation Agency (Europol) and the 
EU Judicial Cooperation Agency (Eurojust) in the registration of asylum seekers, 
the identification and fingerprinting of potential beneficiaries for the temporary 
relocation scheme and countering migrant smuggling. The ‘hotspot model’ has 
been subject to criticism because the hotspots were developed and implemented 
entirely outside any EU legal framework, including EASO’s involvement in 
admissibility of asylum applications in Greece. They have raised concerns about 
their compatibility with fundamental rights challenges, specifically in relation to 
the forced fingerprinting of individuals, quasi-detention practices and 
degrading reception conditions, expedited admissibility interviews and their 
focus on ‘security’ instead of access to international protection. 
Another example of informalisation was the so-called ‘EU-Turkey 
Statement’ adopted in March 2016. Despite being politically portrayed as an 
‘EU-product’, the Luxembourg Court confirmed that the Statement’s authorship 
belonged to the Heads of Government and State of EU member states, not to any 
EU actor whatsoever. When negotiating the deal with Turkish Government, EU 
member states made the strategic choice to avoid the EU Treaties and European 
law all together in an area of shared and exclusive EU competence.  
This meant that they side-lined the EU democratic rule of law guarantees 
envisaged in the Treaties, i.e. the role of the European Commission, democratic 
scrutiny by the European Parliament and judicial control by the Luxembourg 
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Court, as well as domestic checks and balances. Here in addition, the 
fundamental rights impacts and violations during the implementation of the 
EU-Turkey Statement have been amply documented, yet any legal 
responsibilities for these remain to be determined. 
The Commission has also made ‘strategic use’ of EU policy instruments 
not constituting formal legal acts or international agreements envisaged in the 
EU Treaties, and falling outside the EU budget (‘emergency funding’). This is 
the case of ‘readmission arrangements’, which do not correspond with EU 
Readmission Agreements, and aim at cooperating with African governments 
(e.g. Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali and Ethiopia) and some in the Middle East 
(Afghanistan) in the readmission of irregular third country nationals and their 
own nationals. Their implementation has been tied to the use of extra-budget 
and emergency-led EU funding instruments, chiefly the so-called ‘EU Trust 
Funds’ (EUTF). 
The use of EUTF has also been involved in the implementation of EU anti-
human smuggling policies in Libya, including some activities of the 
EUNAVFOR-MED Operation (Operation Sophia). Despite its limited success in 
dismantling the ‘business model’ of smugglers in the Central Mediterranean, 
Operation Sophia’s mandate has been extended on several occasions, to pursue 
activities such as those included in the scope of an EUTF project with Italy aimed 
at “strengthening the operational capacities of Libyan coast guards”. The risk 
here is in indirectly financing trainings and ‘capacity building’ resulting in 
asylum seekers being increasingly prevented from leaving Libya and violating 
the non-refoulement principle in a country that remains in conflict.  
Intergovernmentalism and Rule of Law Backsliding 
The politics of crisis have also come with very high costs for the Juncker 
Commission. ‘In the name of’ the refugee crisis and its exceptionality, several 
member state governments and Ministries of Interior have started to act outside, 
or in direct contravention to, EU Treaty and existing legal frameworks and their 
commitments in the scope of key Union policies. They have also attempted to 
regain lost territory and ‘reverse Europeanisation’ in some of these JHA 
domains. 
This has been the case of the Schengen Area. Since 2016, and giving the 
refugee crisis as justification, Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway 
introduced internal border controls and have since then unlawfully prolonged 
them beyond the foreseen deadline. Nationalism has also prevailed in relation 
to EU asylum policy and the Commission’s proposed reform of the EU Dublin 
Regulation, which is currently stalled inside the Council. This has meant that 
other asylum-related proposals such as the transformation of the European 
Asylum Support Office (EASO) into an EU Asylum Agency are equally stalled. 
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However, not enough attention has been paid to more rigorous enforcement of 
the implementation of already existing CEAS standards, including reception 
conditions, by all these same member states. 
The area of legal immigration has also showed persistent nationalistic 
dynamics preventing further Europeanisation. Despite Juncker’s priority to 
promote a new European policy on legal migration and revise the EU Blue Card 
scheme for attracting highly qualified third country workers, the Commission 
proposal to achieve that goal is currently frozen as it has met resistance from 
some EU member states inside the Council regarding the abolition of parallel 
national schemes for highly skilled foreign workers. 
This Commission has also faced a situation where some EU governments 
have actively engaged in the dismantling of domestic rule of law checks and 
balances and constitutional (separation of powers) guarantees. For the first time, 
the Commission has made use of the EU Rule of Law Framework and the Art. 7 
of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) procedure against Poland. However, 
use of both tools has revealed fundamental procedural barriers: they are highly 
politicised and dependent on member state governments, they do not ensure 
equal treatment among all EU member states, with little potential for effectively 
preventing a risk or a threat to the rule of law from becoming systematic and 
thereby undermining the basis for mutual trust in the EU’s AFSJ. 
Based on the research findings, Section 4 of the book concludes and 
outlines a set of policy priorities for the next European Commission. The second 
half of 2019 will constitute a milestone in EU cooperation on EU AFSJ policies. 
Mid-October will be the twenty-year anniversary of the adoption of the 1999 
‘Tampere Programme’, which laid down for the first time the main JHA policy 
orientations and priorities for the years to come. December 2019 will also be the 
ten-year anniversary of the Lisbon Treaty that brought a majority of EU JHA 
domains under the Community method of cooperation and, by doing so, placed 
EU democratic rule of law and fundamental rights at the centre of AFSJ 
cooperation. The Lisbon Treaty liberalised the ownership of the EU AFSJ policy 
agenda beyond the European Council, the JHA Council and member state 
Ministries of Interior, by recognising an equally central role in priority setting 
by the Commission and the European Parliament. The set of intra-institutional 
and substantive policy priorities presented in Section 4 take into account the 





n September 2014, the current President of the European Commission, Jean-
Claude Juncker, presented his new team of Commissioners and their 
corresponding portfolios. The increasing political salience of Justice and 
Home Affairs policies was reflected in the appointment for the first time of a 
First Vice-President, Frans Timmermans, responsible for the rule of law, the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and ‘Better Regulation’, and with the task of 
coordinating the Directorate Generals for Justice – DG JUST, and that of Home 
Affairs and Migration – DG HOME.  
A 2014 CEPS publication provided a preliminary analysis of the main 
structural and thematic innovations introduced by the new Commission’s 
architecture.1 It raised the following question: Does the new Juncker 
Commission herald a new start for EU Justice and Home Affairs or Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice policies?2  
This book aims at revisiting this question in light of the Commission’s 
intra-institutional situation, and a selection of the most relevant policy and 
legislative outputs during the 8th legislature from mid-2014 to end of 2018. The 
original priority given by this Commission to the rule of law, fundamental rights 
and better regulation was expected to facilitate policy optimisation through 
‘better law making’ and mainstreaming EU rule of law and fundamental rights 
standards in all Commission work covering JHA cooperation. Has this been 
accomplished? 
                                                        
1 Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild (2014), “The Juncker Commission: A New Start for EU 
Justice and Home Affairs Policy?”, CEPS Essay, Brussels, No. 15, 18 September 
(https://www.ceps.eu/publications/juncker-commission-new-start-eu-justice-and-home-
affairs-policy). 
2 These include policy domains falling under the rubric of Title V of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) entitled ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, 
and comprising Chapter 1 (General Provisions, Arts. 67-76), Chapter 2 (Policies on Border 
Checks, Asylum and Immigration, Arts. 77-80); Chapter 4 (Judicial Cooperation in Criminal 
Matters, Arts. 82-86), and Chapter 5 (Police Cooperation, Art. 87-89). The examination does 
not cover EU policies on judicial cooperation in civil matters laid down in Chapter 3 of Title 
V TFEU. According to Article 4.2.f TFEU, the Union counts with shared legal competence with 
Member States. The analysis also covers selected developments falling under the scope of Part 
II TFEU (Non-Discrimination and Citizenship of the Union).  
I
2 | INTRODUCTION 
The Juncker Commission has been dubbed the ‘Commission of crisis’. In 
several of its annual State of the Union addresses Juncker emphasised that ‘the 
EU is in an existential crisis’. 3 He also posed a key question: “Will Europe still 
be a world leader when it comes to the fight for human rights and fundamental 
values?” The set of political guidelines under the title “A New Start for Europe: 
My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change” outlined in his 
Opening Speech before the European Parliament in July 2014 have been subject 
to various national events framed as ‘crises’, which have sent political waves 
over the legitimacy and fundamentals of European integration. 4 
The ‘European refugee humanitarian crisis’ emerging in 2015 brought to 
light the unfinished components and structural gaps characterising EU asylum 
and borders policies.5 A few member states reacted by reintroducing internal 
border checks on persons and derogating the border-free Schengen area.6 The 
period from 2014 to 2018 has seen some acts of terrorism in several European 
cities, which have also put the EU’s role and value added on cross-border 
criminal justice and police cooperation under the spotlight.7 This has come 
alongside the rise of the radical right and Euroscepticism in some EU 
governments, with some member states backsliding in their rule of law systems 
                                                        
3 Jean-Claude Juncker (2016), “State of the Union Address 2016: Towards a better Europe - a 
Europe that protects, empowers and defends”, European Commission Press Release 
Database, Strasbourg, 14 September (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-
3043_en.htm). 
4 Jean-Claude Juncker (2014), “A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness 
and Democratic Change - Political Guidelines for the next European Commission Opening 
Statement in the European Parliament Plenary Session”, Strasbourg, 15 July 
(https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/juncker-political-guidelines-
speech_en.pdf). 
5 Sergio Carrera, Steven Blockmans, Daniel Gros and Elspeth Guild (2015), “The EU’s 
Response to the Refugee Crisis Taking Stock and Setting Policy Priorities”, CEPS Essay, 
Brussels, No. 20, 16 December (https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/ 
EU%20Response%20to%20the%202015%20Refugee%20Crisis_0.pdf). 
6 Sergio Carrera, Marco Stefan, Ngo Chun Luk, Lina Vosyliūtė (2018), “The Future of the 
Schengen Area: Latest Developments and Challenges in the Schengen Governance 
Framework since 2016”, under request of the European Parliament’s LIBE Committee, 
published by the Policy Department for Citizen's Rights and Constitutional Affairs, February 
(https://www.ceps.eu/publications/future-schengen-area-latest-developments-and-
challenges-schengen-governance-framework). 
7 Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild and Valsamis Mitsilegas (2017), “Reflections on the Terrorist 
Attacks in Barcelona Constructing a principled and trust-based EU approach to countering 
terrorism”, Policy Insights, CEPS, Brussels, No 2017-32, August (https://www.ceps.eu/ 
system/files/PI2017-32%20JHA%20Terrorism%20and%20Barcelona.pdf). 
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and dismantling constitutional checks and balances and domestic fundamental 
rights protections.8 
‘Crises’ have served as catalysts or ‘political opportunities’ for the 
adoption of previously controversial and already existing, as well as some new, 
EU policy, legislative and institutional ideas. Some of these have taken 
Europeanisation forward by: first, setting up new EU harmonised legal standards 
and rules; and second, re-designing existing or setting up new Community 
bodies and EU agencies responsible for coordinating and supporting EU 
member states with increasing operational and policy tasks in these policy areas. 
That notwithstanding, ‘the politics of crisis’ have not benefited this 
Commission overall. Policies have often developed in contradiction to EU Treaty 
principles (rule of law and fundamental rights) and lack compliance with better 
regulation guidelines. In addition, they have taken ‘less EU’ and a ‘new start’ 
for:  
First, informalisation and exceptionalism, with increasing ‘strategic use or 
choice’ of EU policy instruments not constituting formal legal acts or 
international agreements as envisaged in the EU Treaties, or falling outside the 
EU budget. These instruments constitute flexible political tools in the scope of 
EU cooperation with third countries, but they also come with a low degree of 
enforceability and high dependency on third-country governments or 
authorities, side-lining EU rule of law and democratic checks and balances, and 
an uneasy relationship with fundamental rights. 
Second, intergovernmentalism and rule of law backsliding in areas of shared 
or even exclusive Union competence, with member states acting outside or in 
direct contravention with EU Treaty and legal frameworks and binding 
commitments in key Union policies, or attempting to regain lost territory and 
‘reverse Europeanisation’ in some of these domains. 
Section 2 of this book focuses on the ways in which the new intra-
institutional configurations brought by the Juncker Commission to JHA-related 
dossiers have worked out and developed in practice. Section 3 takes stock of 
selected main and most relevant legislative AFSJ developments during the 8th 
legislature, which is complemented by a detailed overview of the key legal acts 
presented, adopted or under negotiation during the Juncker Commission in 
Annex I of this book. Based on this, Section 4 concludes by outlining a set of 
priorities for the next European Commission.  
                                                        
8 Sergio Carrera and Petra Bárd (2018), “The European Parliament vote on Article 7 TEU 
against the Hungarian government: Too late, too little, too political?”, CEPS, Brussels, 14 
September (https://www.ceps.eu/publications/european-parliament-vote-article-7-teu-
against-hungarian-government-too-late-too-little). 
4 | INTRODUCTION 
The second half of 2019 will also constitute a milestone in EU cooperation 
on JHA or Area of Freedom, Security and Justice policies. Mid-October sees the 
twenty-year anniversary of the adoption of the so-called ‘Tampere Programme’ 
(European Council Presidency Conclusions, 15 and 16 October 1999). Based on 
the mandate given by the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, the 
Tampere Programme laid down for the first time the main policy orientations 
and priorities to guide the progressive building of an EU AFSJ.9  
December 2019 will also correspond with ten years since the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty,10 which brought a majority of EU JHA domains under 
the Community method of cooperation. It also conferred a legally binding 
nature to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR) and called on the 
Union to accede the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).11 The 
‘Lisbonisation’ of JHA policies represented a decisive step forward in placing 
EU democratic rule of law and fundamental rights at the centre of AFSJ 
cooperation. The policy priorities for the next European Commission presented 
in Section 4 take into account both the priorities and actions included in the 
Tampere Programme and those in the Lisbon Treaty. 
                                                        
9 Elspeth Guild, Sergio Carrera and Alejandro Eggenschwiller (2010), The Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice Ten Years On: Successes and Future Challenges under the Stockholm 
Programme, CEPS Paperback, Brussels (https://www.ceps.eu/publications/area-freedom-
security-and-justice-ten-years-successes-and-future-challenges-under). 
10 Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild (2015), Implementing the Lisbon Treaty: Improving the 
Functioning of the EU in Justice and Home Affairs, European Parliament Study, AFCO 
Committee, Brussels (https://www.ceps.eu/publications/implementing-lisbon-treaty-
improving-functioning-eu-justice-and-home-affairs). 
11 Art. 6.2 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) declared that “The Union shall accede 
to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
Such accession shall not affect the Union's competences as defined in the Treaties.” 
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2. THE COMMISSION’S NEW STRUCTURE: ONE 
HAT TOO MANY? 
he initial appointment of three Commissioners with JHA portfolios was 
one of the main innovations introduced by the Juncker Commission. This 
included the First Vice-President and Commissioner for Better 
Regulation, Inter-Institutional Relations, Rule of Law and the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, Frans Timmermans, the Commissioner for Justice, 
Consumers and Gender Equality (Věra Jourová) and third, the Commissioner 
for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship (Dimitris Avramopoulos).12 Right 
from the start, Timmermans was given a clear mandate to guide, coordinate and 
scrutinise the work of the other two JHA Commissioners and “act as a watchdog, 
upholding the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law, in all the 
Commission’s activities”.13 For the first time, a European Commission included  
a Commissioner in charge of the rule of law. 
In August 2016, Juncker added a fourth Commissioner to this institutional 
triangle: Julian King as Commissioner for the Security Union, also working 
under the guidance of the First Vice-President, and supporting the work of the 
Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship at DG HOME.14 As 
outlined in the Mission Letter issued by President Juncker, the idea behind a 
Commissioner for the Security Union was to implement a “new way of 
working” inside the Commission and to steer and coordinate work across 
                                                        
12 Under the original set of portfolios ‘citizenship’ was under the mandate of Tibor Navracsics, 
Commissioner for Education, Culture and Youth, and it was only later on transferred to 
Avramopoulous’ responsibilities.   
13 European Commission (2014), “The Juncker Commission: A strong and experienced team 
standing for change”, European Commission Press Release Database, Brussels, 10 September 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-984_en.htm). 
14 European Commission (2016), “President Juncker consults the European Parliament on Sir 
Julian King as Commissioner for the Security Union”, European Commission Press Release 
Database, Brussels, 2 August (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2707_en.htm). 
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relevant Commission DGs and services in the area of security.15 This 
materialised in the so-called ‘Security Union Task Force’.16 
The fact that the Juncker Commission has included four different 
Commissioners dealing with JHA or AFSJ-related issues constitutes the best 
illustration of how these policies moved to the top of EU’s political agenda. The 
structuring of the European Commission’s work on JHA or AFSJ into two main 
DGs dealing separately with issues of ‘Justice’ and ‘Home Affairs’ has continued 
to prove a welcome division of responsibilities. 17  It corresponded with previous 
recommendations put forward by CEPS research.18 The additional appointment 
of a First Vice-President responsible for closer internal scrutiny of the 
Commission’s own work in view of EU Treaty values and ‘better regulation’ 
                                                        
15 Jean-Claude Juncker (2016), “Mission Letter to Julian King Commissioner for the Security 
Union”, European Commission, Brussels, 2 August (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/ 
commissioners/sites/cwt/files/commissioner_mission_letters/mission-letter-julian-
king_en.pdf). 
16 Sergio Carrera and Valsamis Mitsilegas (2017), “Constitutionalising the Security Union: 
Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Rights on Countering Terrorism and Crime”, CEPS, Brussels, 
21 November (https://www.ceps.eu/publications/constitutionalising-security-union-
effectiveness-rule-law-and-rights-countering). 
17 The Barroso II Commission, which ran from February 2010, started to work with only one 
DG Justice, Freedom and Security (JLS) under the responsibility of two different 
Commissioners: Viviane Reding (as Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and 
Citizenship), and Cecilia Malmström (as Commissioner for Home Affairs). Reportedly, 
following some ‘turf wars’ between them, Barroso decided to split the DG into two, one 
dealing with ‘Justice’, and another with ‘Home Affairs’. A press article stated that “They 
clashed over proposals to combat child pornography on the internet and over negotiations on 
sharing information about bank transfers. The claim that the two commissioners and their 
teams could work together in one department looked threadbare.” It added that “Officials 
familiar with the decision point out that the Commission’s organisation will match the set-up 
in most national governments, where one minister deals with home affairs issues and one 
with justice matters.” Refer to Politico (2010), A Departmental Split to end turf wars? Reding 
gets her way and her own department; decision follows change of heart by Barroso, 6.9.2010 
(https://www.politico.eu/article/a-departmental-split-to-end-turf-wars/) See Sergio 
Carrera (2012), The Impact of the Treaty of Lisbon over EU Policies on Migration, Asylum and 
Borders: The Struggles over the Ownership of the Stockholm Programme, in E. Guild and P. 
Minderhoud (eds), The First Decade of EU Migration and Asylum Law, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden, pp. 229-254. 
18 Sergio Carrera, Didier Bigo, Elspeth Guild (2009), “The CHALLENGE Project: Final Policy 
Recommendations on the Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security”, CEPS, 
Brussels, 9 September (https://www.ceps.eu/publications/challenge-project-final-policy-
recommendations-changing-landscape-european-liberty-and). 
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principles was an equally promising feature.19 The Task Force approach 
implemented in the field of security also promised a better guarantee of joined-
up intra-institutional strength between several DGs with direct and indirect 
linkages to a specific policy area.  
However, the exact division of responsibilities and portfolios among all 
relevant Commissioners has not been always the clearest. The most visible 
examples have included the portfolios on migration and security, which have by 
and large predominated in this Commission. Past CEPS research suggestions 
called for a clearer distinction of responsibilities between JHA Commissioners 
and relevant DGs, particularly between migration and security portfolios.20 
Instead, the Commissioner for Home Affairs and Migration, and DG HOME, has 
remained officially responsible for EU security policies, including the fight 
against crime and terrorism and police cooperation. This became even more 
reinforced with the additional appointment of a Commissioner for ‘the Security 
Union’ at DG HOME.  
Since the emergence of the ‘European refugee humanitarian crisis’, the 
highest political instances of the Commission (President and First Vice-
President’s offices) took over most of the themes under the responsibility of the 
Commissioner for ‘Home Affairs and Migration’, and that of ‘Security’. In 
contrast to the previous Commission, this has meant a ‘top-down approach’ of 
decision-shaping whereby political decisions have most often emerged from 
these ‘higher instances’ instead of the thematic Commissioners and specific DGs 
with the technical knowledge on these matters.  
During the last three years, First Vice-President Timmermans has been in 
the main driving seat in the Commission’s Reponses to this crisis.21 The political 
salience of migration in this Commission materialised in more than 10 different 
Commission DGs working on issues related to ‘the refugee crisis’. Timmermans 
also played a key role in the Commission’s Security agenda, particularly as 
regards the Union’s responses following terrorist attacks in Europe.22 The High 
                                                        
19 Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild (2014), “A New Start for the EU’s Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice? Setting of Priorities for the New European Commission”, CEPS 
Commentary, Brussels, 23 September (https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/183842/ 
SC%20and%20EG%20New%20Start%20for%20EU%20JHA.pdf).  
20 Carrera et al. (2009), op.cit. 
21 European Commission (2016), “Refugee crisis: Commission reviews 2015 actions and sets 
2016 priorities”, European Commission, Press release, Brussels, 13 January 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-65_en.htm). 
22 Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild, Valsamis Mitsilegas (2017), “Reflections on the Terrorist 
Attacks in Barcelona: Constructing a principled and trust-based EU approach to countering 
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Representative (HR/VP) Federica Mogherini (European External Action 
Service, EEAS)23, also Vice-President of the Commission, has been equally 
‘active’ on the migration and security dossiers, particularly regarding third-
country cooperation, defence24 and external financial assistance.25  
The blurring of intra-institutional responsibilities and Commissioner / 
Vice-President portfolios has played in favour of a home affairs and security 
approach prevailing among all relevant Commissioners and Vice-Presidents. This 
has not always allowed for the necessary checks and balances in the setting and 
implementation of the various Commission policy priorities, particularly 
between home affairs agendas and those related to wider or equally important 
policy approaches such as foreign affairs, development cooperation, 
humanitarian aid, trade, human rights and employment and social affairs. In 
practice there has been not one, but many ‘Home Affairs’ Commissioners, which 
– as the next Section and Annex I demonstrate – has in turn affected the setting 
of priority areas and the policy and legal outputs that have emerged from 2014 
up until December 2018.  
                                                        
terrorism”, CEPS, Brussels, 29 August (https://www.ceps.eu/publications/reflections-
terrorist-attacks-barcelona-constructing-principled-and-trust-based-eu). 
23European Commission (2018), “European Agenda on Migration: Continuous efforts needed 
to sustain progress” European Commission Press release, Brussels, 14 March 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-1763_en.htm). 
24 EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia (https://www.operationsophia.eu/). 
25 European Commission (2015), “Syrian refugee crisis: EU Trust Fund launches single biggest 
EU response package ever for €350 million, helping up to 1.5 million refugees and their host 
communities in Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and Iraq”, European Commission Press Release, 
Brussels, 1 December. (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6212_en.htm). 
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3. LEGAL AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS: 
PROMISES MADE, PROMISES KEPT? 
hat have been the most relevant JHA-related outputs during the 
Juncker Commission? This Section takes stock of some of the most 
relevant legal and policy developments by the European Commission 
from mid-2014 to the end of 2018. Annex I of this book provides a detailed 
overview of all the key JHA legal acts which have been proposed or adopted 
during the Juncker Commission, and those which remain under inter-
institutional negotiation. These have included developments covering the 
following AFSJ-related areas: Schengen and securing external borders (Section 
3.1); asylum and refugees (Section 3.2); legal immigration (Section 3.3); irregular 
entry and third-country cooperation on expulsions (Section 3.4); criminal justice 
and police cooperation (Section 3.5), and the rule of law and fundamental rights 
(Section 3.6).26  
Special attention is given to the enactment of legal acts as envisaged in the 
EU Treaties, and the extent to which they have been formally adopted, or remain 
in inter-institutional negotiation, as well as the adoption and use other policy 
instruments which have been adopted instead of EU legal acts. These 
developments are compared to Juncker’s 2014 Political Guidelines and the 
promises made by the relevant Commissioners in their hearings during 
September and October 2014 before the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 
(LIBE) Committee of the European Parliament. 
The assessment also takes into account the delivery of the key actions and 
priorities, especially the most important legislative priorities, envisaged in the 
Commission’s 2015 European Agenda on Migration27 and European Agenda on 
Security, which set out the Commission’s policy roadmap between 2014 and 
                                                        
26 This Section covers all AFSJ-topic areas with the exception of those falling under the scope 
of judicial cooperation in civil matters.  
27 European Commission (2015), Communication a European agenda on migration 
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2019.28 Despite their official titles, the thematic division between ‘migration’ and 
‘security’ has not been consistently framed and implemented in either of these 
Agendas. A ‘security’ rationale has also been very much present in the European 
Agenda on Migration. According to the Communication on the European 
Agenda on Security “This Agenda has to be seen in conjunction with the 
forthcoming European Agenda on Migration, [which addresses] issues directly 
relevant to security, such as smuggling of migrants, trafficking in human beings, 
social cohesion and border management”.29 Moreover, the European Agenda on 
Security also covered items closely related to judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters under a ‘police cooperation or law enforcement approach’.30  
The main legal developments are critically assessed in view of rule of law, 
fundamental rights and Better Regulation guidelines, all of which correspond to 
the First-Vice President of the Commission’s portfolio, and stand at the 
constitutive basis of the EU legal system,31 and are pivotal ingredients for the 
legitimation of EU AFSJ cooperation laid down in the Treaties. The appraisal 
examines these Commission developments in light of the positions and 
assessments put forward by the European Parliament, the European Court of 
Auditors, the European Ombudsman, the European Data Protection Supervisor 
and the EU Fundamental Rights Agency, as well as key findings from relevant 
international and regional human rights organisations (e.g. UN and Council of 
Europe), civil society actors and academic research. 
                                                        
28 European Commission (2015), Communication a European agenda on security, COM(2015) 
185 final, Brussels 28 April 2015 (https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/ 
files/e-library/documents/basic-documents/docs/eu_agenda_on_security_en.pdf) 
29 Ibid., page 4. See also the reference made to the priority on cooperation against the 
smuggling of migrants inside the EU and in third country cooperation on page 18 of the 
European Agenda on Security.  
30 The Commission did not accompany its migration and security agendas with an European 
Agenda on Justice, leaving an important gap in respect of judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters. See for instance references to judicial cooperation in criminal matters on pages 10 and 
19/20 of the Communication on the European Agenda on Security. 
31 Special attention is given to their impact and compliance with the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, which has legally binding force, as well as Art. 2 of the Treaty on 
European Union according to which “The Union is founded on the values of respect for 
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, 
including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the 
Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, 
solidarity and equality between women and men prevail” and Art. 6 TEU.  
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3.1 Schengen and securing external borders  
3.1.1 The European Border and Coast Guard 
Securing the EU’s external borders has constituted a key policy priority for this 
Commission. One of the most politically visible Commission initiatives in 
response to the crisis was the presentation of a new European Border and Coast 
Guard (EBCG), a reform of the older Frontex (EU External Borders) Agency set 
in Warsaw (Poland). The reinforcement of Frontex had been already presented 
as one of the key priorities in the political guidelines put forward by the 
President Juncker in his Inaugural Speech “A New Start for Europe”.32 
The idea of establishing a European border guard was not new.33 The peak 
of the refugee crisis provided the necessary political momentum for the 
Commission to move forward quickly with a legislative proposal in December 
2015, which arrived without any impact assessment.34 The Regulation 2016/1624 
on the EBCG was adopted in record time and published in the Official Journal 
on September 2016.35 It increased human and financial resources for the Frontex 
agency, and granted it a reinforced coordination role over both national border 
and coast guard authorities.  
The new mandate also extended the agency’s operational mandate to 
include the fields of returns and readmission, and third-country cooperation. In 
the field of expulsions, the agency has been given a reinforced competence to 
                                                        
32 Jean-Claude Juncker (2014), “A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, 
Fairness and Democratic Change - Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 
Opening Statement in the European Parliament Plenary Session”, Strasbourg, 15 July 
(https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/juncker-political-guidelines-
speech_en.pdf). 
33 Sergio Carrera (2010), “Towards a Common European Border Service?”, CEPS, Brussels, 15 
June (https://www.ceps.eu/publications/towards-common-european-border-service). 
34 European Commission (2015), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulation (EC) No 
2007/2004, Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 and Council Decision 005/267/EC, COM(2015) 671 
final 2015/0310 (COD), Strasbourg, 15 December (https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/ 
sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/legal-documents/docs 
/regulation_on_the_european_border_and_coast_guard_en.pdf) 
35 European Parliament and Council (2016), Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard 
and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC, L251/1, 16.9.2016 
(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R1624&from=EN). 
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implement joint return flights, and to be involved in national return procedures, 
which turns it into an ‘EU Returns Agency’.36 Still, the EBCG remains ‘just a 
name’ which does not fully reflect its actual competences. The new (Frontex+) 
Agency is still dependent on EU member state contributions, political 
willingness to cooperate and domestic capacities and law enforcement 
specificities.37 It does not have its own personnel, nor the power of command 
over national authorities.  
In his last State of the Union Speech delivered on September 2018, Juncker 
presented “the last elements needed for compromise on migration and border 
reform”38, which included an additional proposal for a Regulation further fine 
tuning and reinforcing the EBCG.39 The main idea behind it is to further 
strengthen Frontex operational capabilities by setting the agency up with 10,000 
operational staff by 2020 and its own vessels, planes and vehicles, together with 
a budget increase of €1.3 billion. The new EBCG would have new executive 
powers to carry out identity checks, and authorise or refuse entry. 
The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) issued an 
Opinion on 27 November 201840 about the newest EBCG proposal where it 
highlighted the need for strengthening the overall fundamental rights protection 
framework of the proposed Agency’s mandate. The FRA recommended the EU 
                                                        
36 Sergio Carrera, Steven Blockmans, Daniel Gros and Elspeth Guild (2015), “The EU’s 
Response to the Refugee Crisis: Taking Stock and Setting Policy Priorities”, CEPS, Brussels, 
No.20, 16 December (https://www.ceps.eu/publications/eu%E2%80%99s-response-
refugee-crisis-taking-stock-and-setting-policy-priorities). 
37Sergio Carrera and Leonhard den Hertog (2016), “A European Border and Coast Guard: 
What’s in a name?”, CEPS, Brussels, 8 March (https://www.ceps.eu/publications/ 
european-border-and-coast-guard-what%E2%80%99s-name). 
38 European Commission (2018), “State of the Union 2018 – Commission proposes last 
elements needed for compromise on migration and border reform, European Commission 
Press Release Database, Strasbourg, 12 September (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-18-5712_en.htm). 
39 European Commission (2018), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action 
n°98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) n° 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
and Regulation (EU) n° 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council – A 
contribution from the European Commission to the Leaders’ meeting in Salzburg on 19-20 
September 2018, COM/2018/631 final, Brussels, 12 September (https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:3550f179-b661-11e8-99ee-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/ 
DOC_1&format=PDF). 
40 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Opinion, The revised European Border 
and Coast Guard Regulation and its fundamental rights implications, FRA Opinion – 5/2018 
[EBCG] Vienna, 27 November 2018 (https://fra.europa.eu/en/opinion/2018/eu-border-
agency). 
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legislator reinforce the envisaged complaint mechanism in cases of fundamental 
rights violations, enhancing the role, capacity and independence of the 
fundamental rights officer and better operationalising fundamental rights 
protections in all newly envisaged operational activities.  
The need for these proposals corresponds with CEPS research which has 
revealed:41 first, the limited powers and independence of complaint bodies and 
human rights institutions in several EU member states, which prevent an 
effective follow-up of complaints in the context of border controls and 
surveillance; and second, the lack of human resources, autonomy and the power 
to conduct thorough and systematic follow-up monitoring of national 
complaints by by the Frontex Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO). 
The revised EBCG mandate has also incurred criticism from the United 
Nations. A Joint Communication issued by UN Special Procedures (five UN 
Special Rapporteurs and two Working Groups) to the Presidents of the 
European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Council on 
18 September 2018.42 The Joint Communication raised serious concerns about 
the more recent proposal on the further reinforcement of the EBCG ahead of the 
Austrian presidency meeting in Salzburg on 19 and 20 September 2018, and 
concluded that:   
We are concerned that these measures are being proposed as a means 
to leverage political gain in response to the worrying rise of anti-
immigration and xenophobic hate speeches and stances, as reflected 
by increased acts and discourses of violence and racism against 
migrants in various EU member States.   
3.1.2 The Schengen Area  
The Commission has invested efforts in safeguarding the integrity of the 
Schengen Area in light of some EU member states reintroducing systematic 
internal border checks on persons. Schengen countries had in the past frequently 
reintroduced internal border controls in exceptional and casuistic cases.43 With 
                                                        
41 Sergio Carrera and Marco Stefan (2018), Complaint Mechanisms in Border Management 
and Return Operations in Europe: Effective Remedies for Victims of Human Rights 
Violations? CEPS Paperback, Brussels (https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/ 
Complaint%20Mechanisms_A4.pdf). 
42 Refer to (https://ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/SRMigrants/Comments/OL_OTH_64_ 
2018.pdf). 
43 The motives included for the purposes of safeguarding international events taking place in 
their countries, in attempts to restrict irregular immigration, as a response to serious health 
scares and similar circumstances. See Annex of S. Carrera, E. Guild, M. Merlino and J. Parkin 
(2011), A Race against Solidarity: The Schengen Regime and the Franco-Italian Affair, CEPS 
Liberty and Security in Europe Series, Brussels.  
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the emergence of the ‘European refugee humanitarian crisis’ in summer 2015, 
Germany, Austria and Slovenia took immediate action and reintroduced 
internal border checks in September 2015. This was followed by Denmark, 
Sweden and Norway, which in November 2015 implemented similar actions. 
Since 2016 Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway have unlawfully 
prolonged internal border controls.  
All these decisions took place on the basis of Art. 25 SBC. This provision 
allows Schengen countries to exceptionally re-introduce checks, as a measure of 
last resort, “when there is a serious threat to public policy or internal security in 
a member state” at all or specific parts of its internal borders. They can do so 
subject to specific deadlines: only for up to 30 days or “for the foreseeable 
duration of the serious threat if its duration exceeds 30 days”. Importantly, Art. 
25 SBC stipulates that the total time period shall not exceed six months. 
In the context of the first round of evaluations under the new Schengen 
Evaluation Mechanism (SEM), the Commission carried out an unannounced on-
site visit to several locations in Greece in the midst of the crisis in November 
2015 to evaluate the implementation of the Schengen acquis. The evaluation 
results unsurprisingly concluded that “there are serious deficiencies in the 
carrying out of external border control”. The Commission provided a number of 
recommendations to Greece in February 2016, which was then adopted by the 
Council “to remedy serious deficiencies in external border management”, 
chiefly the “identification, registration and fingerprinting” of those irregularly 
entering the country.  
In its March 2016 Communication ‘Back to Schengen’,44 the Commission 
concluded that if “migratory pressures and the serious deficiencies in external 
border control” were to persist beyond May 2016, it would present a proposal 
to the Council to operationalise Art. 29 SBC. The Commission did present a 
proposal to the Council in May 201645 recommending the launch of Art. 29 SBC 
                                                        
44 European Commission (2016), Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the European Council and the Council on Back to Schengen - A Roadmap, 
COM(2016) 120 final, Brussels, 4 March (https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/ 
sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/docs/ 
communication-back-to-schengen-roadmap_en.pdf). 
45 European Commission (2016), Proposal for a Council Implementing Decision setting out a 
recommendation for temporary internal border control in exceptional circumstances putting 
the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk, COM(2016) 275 final 2016/140 (NLE), 
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“until the structural deficiencies in external border control are mitigated or 
remedied with Greece”, which the Council adopted in a Decision setting out a 
Recommendation46 for prolonging temporary internal border control in 
“exceptional circumstances putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area 
at risk”. The Decision allowed the above-mentioned five EU Schengen members, 
i.e. Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, to maintain internal 
border controls for a period of six months (October 2016).  
The same Council Decision provided specific guidelines concerning the 
exact border points where checks could be reintroduced (a small part of their 
internal borders corresponding with very specific land border zones and ports), 
as well as fairly concrete reporting procedures insisting on the necessity and 
proportionality of these measures as a priority and stating that “Border controls 
should be targeted and limited in scope, frequency, location and time, to what 
is strictly necessary to respond to the serious threat and to safeguard public 
policy and internal security.” 
Art. 29 SBC was originally designed as a provision that would never be 
used in practice. History proved this hope to be wrong. Art. 29 provides for a 
specific procedure to apply in exceptional situations when the overall 
functioning of the Schengen area is at risk “as a result of persistent serious 
deficiencies relating to external border control”. It allows member countries to 
introduce internal border controls for an additional period of six months, which 
can only be renewed three consecutive times with similar six-month periods. 
The official deadline for all these Ministries of Interior to ‘come back to 
Schengen’ was October/November 2017. However, the same five member states 
not only exhausted the possibility of extending three times under the Art. 29 SBC 
procedure. They have also continued carrying out localised internal border 
checks until the time of writing. Following expiration of the Art. 29 SBC 
deadline, all relevant Schengen members then continued, again on the basis of 
Art. 25 SBC, to conduct internal border checks. The six-month period foreseen 
in Art. 25 SBC has now also been exhausted. More recently, the Ministries of 
Interior of Austria, Denmark, Germany and Norway have notified a further 
extension of internal border checks until May 2019, Sweden until February 2019, 
and France until April 2019.  
                                                        
46 European Council (2016), Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/894 of 12 May 2016 on 
setting out a recommendation for temporary internal border control in exceptional 
circumstances putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk, L 151/8, 8.6.2016 
(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016D0894 
&from=EN). 
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The main official justifications provided in the notifications issued have 
mainly related to the so-called “migratory crisis and resulting secondary 
movement of undocumented and irregular immigrants”, and the risks of further 
secondary movements from those asylum seekers who are still in Greece. 
However, as the Commission stated in the 2017 Communication Preserving and 
Strengthening Schengen,47 and the accompanying Press Release,48 the use of 
asylum or migration – and so-called ‘secondary movements’ – as the basis for 
justifying the prolongation of internal border checks no longer constitute 
legitimate grounds for derogating Schengen. The ‘secondary movements’ 
argument calls for equally meticulous examination and evidence showing the 
exact scale and relevance of this issue at the time, and as developed in Section 
3.2.2 below, because of possible legitimate reasons for applicants not staying in 
the first state of irregular entry.  
The Commission’s strategy has been to ‘squeeze’ the scope and conditions 
under which these member states are conducting internal border checks.49 In 
addition, the Commission issued a new Proposal for a Regulation amending the 
rules applicable to the temporary reintroduction of internal border controls.50 
The Regulation would allow reintroduction of internal border checks under Art. 
25 SBC for a period of up to one year, which could be extended for a maximum 
length of two years. In cases where “exceptional circumstances” falling under 
Art. 29 SBC exist, the total period could be prolonged by a further time of two 
years. The only obligation for relevant governments would be to justify their 
decision on a ‘risk assessment’ explaining how internal border controls 
contribute to addressing the perceived threat. The proposal is under negotiation. 
                                                        
47 European Commission (2017), Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council on preserving and strengthening Schengen, COM(2017) 570 final, 
Brussels, 27 September (https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-
we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20170927_communication_on_preserving_ 
and_strengthening_schengen_en.pdf). 
48 European Commission (2017), “Questions & Answers: Preserving and strengthening the 
Schengen area”, European Commission’s Fact Sheet, Brussels, 27 September 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-3408_en.htm). 
49 Elspeth Guild, Evelien Brouwer, Kees Groenendijk and Sergio Carrera (2015), “What is 
happening to the Schengen borders?”, CEPS, Brussels, 16 December (https://www.ceps.eu/ 
publications/what-happening-schengen-borders). 
50 European Commission (2017), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 as regards the rules applicable to the 
temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders, COM(2017) 571 final, Brussels, 
27 September (https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/ 
policies/european-agenda-migration/20170927_proposal_for_a_regulation_amending_ 
regulation_eu_2016_399_en.pdf). 
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The European Parliament51 has been critical as the proposal came without 
an impact assessment and it could ‘legalise’52 unlawful practices in member 
states. Moreover, as evidence by EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) 
shows,53 little has been said about the impacts that these internal border checks 
have had on the fundamental rights of asylum seekers and refugees.  
3.2 Asylum and refugees  
Another key political priority for this Commission has been asylum policy. This 
has constituted one of the main ‘turf wars’ between the Commission and some 
EU member states governments during this legislature. The refugee 
humanitarian crisis in EU countries in Greece and Italy clearly showed the 
fundamental limits and inherent flaws in the distribution model envisaged in 
the 1990 EU Dublin system. It exposed the lacunae affecting existing EU sharing 
of responsibility rules where extraordinarily large numbers of people travel by 
land, rather than by air, to the EU.54 It also revealed the on-the-ground 
weaknesses in reception conditions and judicial/administrative asylum 
capacities of external frontier states.55  
3.2.1 Relocation and hotspots  
As an immediate response, the Commission proposed an emergency temporary 
relocation mechanism56 in two separate proposals for a Council Decision 
                                                        
51 European Parliament (2018), Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 as regards the rules 
applicable to the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders, 
(COM(2017)0571 – C8-0326/2017 – 2017/0245(COD)), A8-0356/2018, Committee on Civil 
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Rapporteur Tanja Fajon, 29 October 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A8-2018-
0356&format=XML&language=EN). 
52 Carrera et al. (2018a), op.cit. 
53 FRA (2018), “Periodic data collection on the migration situation in the EU - November 2018 
Highlights” (http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2018/migration-overviews-november-
2018), November. 
54 Advocate General Sharpston Opinion, C-490/16, Jafari v. Austria and A.S. v. Slovenia, 8 June 
2017. 
55 Sergio Carrera, Steven Blockmans, Jean-Pierre Cassarino, Daniel Gros and Elspeth Guild 
(2017), The European Border and Coast Guard Addressing migration and asylum challenges in the 
Mediterranean?, CEPS, Brussels (https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/TFR%20EU%20 
Border%20and%20Coast%20Guard%20with%20cover_0.pdf). 
56 Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild (2015), “Can the new refugee relocation system work? Perils 
in the Dublin logic and flawed reception conditions in the EU”, CEPS, Brussels, No. 334, October 
(https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/PB334%20RefugeeRelocationProgramme.pdf). 
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published respectively in July57 and September 201558 establishing a distribution 
key model for relocating an original number of 160,000 asylum-seekers from 
Italy and Greece to other EU member states and which covered people arriving 
up until 26 September 2017. Later on, 20,000 applicants from this total figure 
were moved for resettlement.59 
This came along a ‘hotspot’ approach60 to assist with the support of EU 
agencies like Frontex, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), the EU 
Police Cooperation Agency (Europol) and EU Judicial Cooperation Agency 
(Eurojust) in the identification and registration of asylum seekers in specific 
locations (mainly ‘centres’ in selected ports) in Greece and Italy, and the 
identification of potential beneficiaries for the temporary relocation scheme. The 
hotspots main objectives were the implementation of obligatory fingerprinting, 
identification of protection needs and processing of asylum applications and 
ensuring expulsion. They sought a ‘100% identification rate’. 
The temporary relocation + hotspot model has been subject to criticism. Not 
least in light of the low level of compliance by EU member states in meeting their 
originally foreseen ‘quotas’ and agreed pledges,61 the complete lack of 
compliance by countries like Hungary and Poland, which did not relocate one 
single person.62 But also because of the fundamental rights challenges inherent 
                                                        
57 Council of the European Union (2015), “Resolution of the Representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council on relocating from Greece 
and Italy 40 000 persons in clear need of international protection”, 11131/15, ASIM 63, 
Brussels, 22 July (https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11131-2015-
INIT/en/pdf). 
58 Council of the European Union (2015), Council Decision establishing provisional measures 
in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, 12098/15, ASIM 87, 
Interinstitutional File: 2015/0209 (NLE), Brussels, 22 September 
(https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12098-2015-INIT/en/pdf). 
59 Council of the European (2015), Conclusions of the Representatives of the Governments of 
the Member States meeting within the Council on resettling through multilateral and national 
schemes 20 000 persons in clear need of international protection, 11130/15, ASIM 62, RELEX 
633, Brussels, 22 July (https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11130-2015-
INIT/en/pdf). 
60 European Commission, “The Hotspot approach to managing exceptional migratory flows” 
(https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/ 
european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/2_hotspots_en.pdf). 
61 European Commission (2017) “Migration: Record month for relocations from Italy and 
Greece Brussels, European Commission Press release”, 26 July 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-2104_en.htm). 
62 European Commission (2017), Report from the commission to the European Parliament, the 
European Council and the Council on the Fifteenth report on relocation and resettlement, 
COM(2017) 465 final, Brussels, 6 September (https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/ 
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to the operability and goals of the hotspot approach which has in some cases led 
to de facto detention of asylum seekers under deficient and degrading reception 
conditions,63 the use of coercive practices for fingerprinting asylum seekers and 
the lack of accountability of EU agencies for their actions on the ground, which 
have been magnified by the fact that the hotspots were developed and 
implemented outside any EU legal framework.64 Despite this, the Juncker 
Commission has argued for the continuation of the hotspot model and more 
recently advanced its view for complementing it with the concept of so-called 
“controlled centres” inside the EU.65 
The temporary relocation mechanism was adopted through an 
‘emergency procedure’ which turned out to put its entire legality at stake before 
the Court of Justice. The Hungarian and Slovakian governments asked the 
Luxembourg Court to annul the Council Decision of September 2015 on 
relocation,66 challenging its legally binding nature and alleging, inter alia, the 
infringement of essential procedural requirements and principles foreseen in the 
Treaties. They argued that that the legal basis of the Decision, i.e. Article 78.3 
TFEU, was not correct and its required adoption procedures had not been 
respected. In their view, the measure constituted a legislative act (Council 
Decision) and should have been adopted under full democratic scrutiny by 
European Parliament. While the Council had made “essential changes” to the 
                                                        
homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20170906_fifteenth_ 
report_on_relocation_and_resettlement_en.pdf). 
63 Aspasia Papadopoulou (2016), “The implementation of the hotspots in Italy and Greece A 
study”, European Council for Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) (https://www.ecre.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/HOTSPOTS-Report-5.12.2016.pdf). 
64 FRA (2015), Processing biometric data for immigration, asylum and border management 
purposes has become common. This focus paper looks at measures authorities can take to 
enforce the obligation of newly arrived asylum seekers and migrants in an irregular situation 
to provide fingerprints for inclusion in Eurodac, October (https://fra.europa.eu/en/ 
publication/2015/fundamental-rights-implications-obligation-provide-fingerprints-
eurodac). 
65 European Commission, Press Release, Managing Migration: Commission expands on 
disembarkation and controlled centre concepts, 24 July 2018 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-18-4629_en.htm). Refer also to European Commission (2018), Non Paper on 
“controlled centres” in the EU – interim framework (https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/ 
20180724_non-paper-controlled-centres-eu-member-states_en.pdf). 
66 Court of Justice of the European Union (2017), The Court dismisses the actions brought by 
Slovakia and Hungary against the provisional mechanism for the mandatory relocation of 
asylum seekers, Judgment in Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15 Slovakia and Hungary v 
Council, Press Release No 91/17 Luxembourg, 6 September 2017 (https://curia.europa.eu/ 
jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-09/cp170091en.pdf). 
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original Commission Proposal, mainly removing Hungary from the recipient 
countries, they pointed out that the Parliament had not been re-consulted.  
Indeed, ‘in the name of emergency’, the European Parliament was only 
‘informed’. It only expressed formal consent on the first version of the 
Decision,67 not on the final one.68 Luckily for the European Commission, the 
Court of Justice considered that the procedures had been respected and that the 
obligation to consult the Parliament had been complied with. 69 The Court 
assumed, perhaps too easily, that “in its legislative resolution of 17 September 
2015 expressing its support for the Commission’s initial proposal, the Parliament 
must necessarily have taken account of that fundamental change in Hungary’s 
status” purely based on a statement delivered on 16 September 2015 by the 
President of the Council at an extraordinary plenary sitting of the Parliament.  
While Parliament’s dilemma was seen as being between insisting on its 
prerogative or saving the temporary relocation scheme, the adoption of the final 
version of the temporary relocation scheme without clearly respecting the 
requirement of formal consultation by Parliament weakened its own position 
more generally, towards both the Commission and EU member states in a 
crucial decision affecting EU asylum policy and the Union’s response to the 
crisis.  
The Court also reminded the two governments about one of the key 
contributions of the ‘Lisbonisation’ of EU asylum policy. It underlined that the 
Council had acted correctly by putting into effect the general principle of 
solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility envisaged in Art. 80 TFEU.70 Based 
                                                        
67 European Parliament legislative resolution of 17 September 2015 on the proposal for a 
Council decision establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for 
the benefit of Italy, Greece and Hungary (COM(2015)0451 – C8-0271/2015 – 2015/0209(NLE)) 
(Consultation) (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN 
&reference=P8-TA-2015-0324). 
68 European Parliament, Press Release, MEPs give go-ahead to relocate an additional 120,000 
asylum seekers in the EU, 16.9.2015 (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-
room/20150915IPR93259/meps-give-go-ahead-to-relocate-an-additional-120-000-asylum-
seekers-in-the-eu). 
69 Court of Justice of the European Union (2017), The Court dismisses the actions brought by 
Slovakia and Hungary against the provisional mechanism for the mandatory relocation of 
asylum seekers, Judgment in Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15 Slovakia and Hungary v 
Council, Press Release No 91/17 Luxembourg, 6 September 2017 
(https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-09/cp170091en.pdf). 
70 The CJEU concluded in paragraphs 252 that “In that regard, the Council, when adopting 
the contested decision, was in fact required, as is stated in recital 2 of the decision, to give 
effect to the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial 
implications, between the Member States, which applies, under Article 80 TFEU, when the 
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on this and the above grounds, it therefore dismissed as unfounded the actions 
brought by the Hungarian and Slovakian governments.  
The Commission launched infringement proceedings against the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland in July 201771 and brought them to the attention 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in December 2017.72 The 
Juncker Commission also made use of infringement proceedings against 
Hungary for failure to comply with EU asylum standards dealing with reception 
conditions and procedures, as well as the criminalisation of humanitarian 
assistance, in July 2018.73 Similarly, it launched infringement proceedings 
against the Bulgarian government for failure to implement the Asylum acquis, in 
particular based on shortcomings in reception conditions and asylum 
procedures.74 
3.2.2 Reforming the Common European Asylum System 
In May75 and July76 2016 the European Commission presented a package of 
seven legislative proposals aimed at reforming the Common European Asylum 
System (CEAS) with the aim of addressing some of the deficiencies identified in 
                                                        
EU common policy on asylum is implemented.” It continued by saying in paragraph 253 that 
“Thus, in the circumstances of this case, there is no ground for complaining that the Council 
made a manifest error of assessment when it considered, in view of the particular urgency of 
the situation, that it had to take –– on the basis of Article 78(3) TFEU, read in the light of 
Article 80 TFEU and the principle of solidarity between the Member States laid down therein 
–– provisional measures imposing a binding relocation mechanism, such as that provided for 
in the contested decision.” 
71 European Commission (2017), “Relocation: Commission launches infringement procedures 
against the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland”, European Commission Press release, 
Brussels, 14 June (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1607_en.htm). 
72European Commission (2017), “Relocation: Commission refers the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland to the Court of Justice”, European Commission Press release, Brussels, 
7 December. (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5002_en.htm). 
73European Commission (2018), “Migration and Asylum: Commission takes further steps in 
infringement procedures against Hungary”, European Commission Press release, Brussels, 19 
July (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4522_EN.htm).  
74European Commission (2018), “November infringements package: key decisions”, 
European Commission Fact Sheet Brussels, 8 November (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-18-6247_EN.htm). 
75 European Commission (2016), “Towards a sustainable and fair Common European Asylum 
System”, European Commission Press release, Brussels, 4 May (http://europa.eu/ 
rapid/press-release_IP-16-1620_en.htm). 
76 European Commission (2016), “Completing the reform of the Common European Asylum 
System: towards an efficient, fair and humane asylum policy”, European Commission Press 
release, Brussels, 13 July (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2433_en.htm). 
22 | LEGAL AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS: PROMISES MADE, PROMISES KEPT? 
light of the crisis. A key controversial issue related the proposed reform of the 
EU Dublin Regulation,77 which called for the establishment of a permanent 
corrective (relocation) mechanism in cases when member states would have to 
deal with “a disproportionate number of asylum seekers” such as the one 
experienced during the refugee crisis, and a system of ‘financial solidarity’ (i.e. 
penalties) for those EU governments not participating in the scheme.  
The Commission’s proposed reform did not abolish one of the main 
underlying causes of the humanitarian crisis, i.e. the general (EU Dublin system) 
rule according to which the first state of irregular entry would be responsible for 
assessing asylum claims and the obligation for asylum seekers not to seek 
international protection in a second member state. The Commission also did not 
support calls to include a preference-matching system whereby the choices of 
the individuals involved would be taken into account. A main Commission 
concern has been to find ways to prevent ‘secondary movements’ of asylum 
seekers within the Schengen area and sanctioning those who make them. Little 
consideration has being given to the existence of possible legitimate grounds for 
people to seek asylum in a second member state, such as degrading or inhuman 
reception conditions (including lack of adequate housing provision and 
destitution) in the first state of irregular arrival. 
In a step further and separate from the Commission proposal, the 
European Parliament called for a compulsory relocation system to become the 
general rule of the CEAS and retiring the first irregular entry-rule of the EU 
Dublin system.78 It also expressed its disagreement79 with the penalisation of or 
punitive approach towards asylum seekers present in the re-cast proposal on 
                                                        
77 European Commission (2016), Proposal for a Regulation of the European parliament and of 
the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State 
responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the 
Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast) 2016/0133 (COD), 
COM(2016) 270 final, Brussels 4 May (https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/ 
homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-
implementation-package/docs/20160504/dublin_reform_proposal_en.pdf). 
78 European Parliament (2017), Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the 
Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in 
one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), A8-
0345/2017, 6 November. (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A8-2017-0345+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN). 
79 European Parliament (2016), Reception of applicants for international protection. Recast 
2016/0222(COD) (https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do 
?reference=2016/0222(COD)&l=en). 
AN APPRAISAL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF CRISIS | 23 
 
reception conditions.80 On this basis, the Commission recommended in 
December 2017 that “a way forward could be to adopt an approach where the 
component of compulsory relocation would apply to situations of serious crisis, 
while in less challenging situations, relocation would be based on voluntary 
commitments from member states”.81 
Among other legislative proposals, the Commission encouraged the use 
of ‘safe third country’ notions.82 The main idea was to incentivise EU member 
states for them to use this concept more regularly and have a more harmonised 
approach across the EU. The value added of such a policy can be questioned in 
light of the already existing safe country notions and practices across EU 
member states.83 In addition to the fundamental rights risk of using these 
notions too liberally without securing an individualised asylum assessment, the 
very premises of the safe third country paradigm are flawed.84 It assumes that 
third countries will accept receiving the label of ‘safe’ and therefore the heavy 
responsibility that it carries. It also relies upon the unrealistic idea that these 
countries, particularly African states, can be supported by the EU in developing 
                                                        
80 European Commission (2016), Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international 





81 European Commission (2017), Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the European Council and the Council on Commission contribution to the EU 
Leaders' thematic debate on a way forward on the external and the internal dimension of 




82 European Commission (2016), Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council establishing a common procedure for international protection in the Union and 
repealing Directive 2013/32/EU 2016/0224 (COD), COM(2016) 467 final, Brussels, 13 July 
(http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/1-2016-467-EN-F1-1.PDF). 
83European Commission, “an EU ‘safe countries of origin’ list”, (https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/ 
background-information/docs/2_eu_safe_countries_of_origin_en.pdf). 
84 ECRE (2016), Comments on the Commission Proposal for an Asylum Procedures 
Regulation COM(2016) 467, European Council on Refugees and Exiles, November 
(https://www.ecre.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ECRE-Comments-APR_-November-2016-final.pdf). 
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their domestic asylum systems and ratifying relevant UN refugee protection 
instruments in a way that would formally allow them to qualify as ‘safe’. 
Yet, does any African country have that capacity, and would they have 
any actual appetite ‘to build capacity’ on asylum and be ‘safe’ for asylum 
seekers? Doing so would automatically mean becoming responsible for 
assessing asylum applications and providing durable solutions for potential 
beneficiaries of international protection in their countries. The proposed 
Commission approach has disregarded these fundamental questions and also 
risks ignoring geopolitical implications. Often little consideration is given to 
third country perspectives and interests when engaging in wider diplomatic and 
foreign affairs relations which extend far beyond the EU’s ‘migration 
management’ priority. 
In July 2016, the Commission presented a Proposal for a Regulation 
establishing a Union Resettlement Framework,85 which aimed at establishing “a 
more structured, harmonised, and permanent framework for resettlement 
across the Union” and reducing current divergences among national 
resettlement practices by harmonising a “collective EU approach to 
resettlement”. The Commission’s proposal provided a common definition of the 
notion of resettlement,86 the factors to be considered for including non-EU 
countries from where resettlement would occur and a set of common eligibility 
criteria and grounds of exclusion for applicants. If adopted, the Regulation 
would establish common procedures and annual Union resettlement plans with 
targeted resettlement schemes through European Commission implementing 
acts.87 The proposal also included a migration management approach by including 
among the set of factors to be considered in selecting third countries to benefit 
from resettlement their willingness and “effective cooperation” on reducing 
irregular entries and increasing readmission rates, as well as the conclusion of 
readmission agreements.88 
                                                        
85 European Commission (2016), Proposal for a regulation establishing a Union Resettlement 
Framework and amending Regulation (EU) No 516/2014 of the European Parliament and the 
Council, Brussels, 13.7.2016 COM(2016) 468 final 2016/0225 (COD) (https://ec.europa.eu/ 
home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/ 
proposal-implementation-package/docs/20160713/resettlement_system_en.pdf). 
86 Art. 2 of the Proposal defines resettlement as “the admission of third-country nationals and 
stateless persons in need of international protection from a third country to which or within 
which they have been displaced to the territory of the Member States with a view to granting 
them international protection”. 
87 See Arts. 7 and 8, as well as 10 and 11 on procedures. 
88 Art. 4.d.iv of the proposal which states that “In determining the regions or third countries 
from which resettlement shall occur within the Union Resettlement Framework, in 
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Several civil society actors that have played an active role in the 
implementation of current resettlement programmes issued a Joint Comments 
Paper on 14 November 2016 raising important concerns about the proposed 
Union Resettlement Framework.89 They highlighted how “the proposed 
Framework is overly reactive and focuses unduly on migration control 
objectives, to the potential detriment of resettlement’s function as a lifesaving 
tool and a durable solution.” They also reminded the Commission that 
resettlement “must be regarded as complementary to, and not a replacement of, 
spontaneous arrivals and the right to seek asylum in Europe.” The Joint Letter 
also raised concerns about the ‘conditionality’ of resettlement humanitarian 
options with priority regions selected on the basis of political cooperation with 
the EU in other Union security- oriented fields such as expulsions and 
readmission. 
In November 2016, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) provided comments in light of its internationally 
recognised mandate and its current central global role in implementing 
resettlement activities.90 UNHCR raised additional concerns about the risk of the 
Union resettlement framework blurring the distinction between resettlement as 
a tool for protection and family reunification. In its view, the Union framework 
should avoid duplications with already existing structures and take place under 
“the existing international resettlement architecture”. Importantly, it also 
pointed out that it “understands States’ concerns and desire to deploy various 
tools to effectively manage migration. Yet, resettlement is, by design, a tool to 
                                                        
accordance with the implementing acts referred to in Articles 7 and 8, the following factors 
shall be taken into consideration: “(d) a third country’s effective cooperation with the Union 
in the area of migration and asylum, including: (i) reducing the number of third-country 
nationals and stateless persons irregularly crossing the border into the territory of the Member 
States coming from that third country; (iv) increasing the rate of readmission of third-country 
nationals and stateless persons irregularly staying in the territory of the Member States such 
as through the conclusion and effective implementation of readmission agreements”. 
89 Joint Comments Paper by: Caritas Europa, Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe 
(CCME), European Council for Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), International Catholic Migration 
Commission (ICMC Europe), International Rescue Committee (IRC), Red Cross EU office 
(2016), on European Commission proposal for a Regulation establishing a Union Resettlement 
Framework and amending Regulation (EU) No 516/2014 of the European Parliament and the 
Council COM(2016) 468, 13 July 2016, Brussels, 14 November 2016 
(https://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/NGO-joint-comments-resettlement-
141116.pdf). 
90 UNHCR Observations and Considerations (2016), Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Union Resettlement Framework and 
amending Regulation (EU) No 516/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council, 
November 2016 (https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5890b1d74.pdf). 
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provide protection and a durable solution to refugees rather than a migration 
management tool”. 
All in all, the latest EU asylum reform remains frozen at the time of 
writing, which leaves the key actions (including both those identified as 
‘immediate actions’ and the ones falling under Pillar 3 of the European Agenda 
on Migration, “Europe’s duty to protect: A strong common asylum policy”), by 
and large unaccomplished. There are no indications that the current deadlock 
will be fully overcome any time soon. The main reason is lack of consensus 
among some EU member states in finding new ways or ‘models’ for distributing 
responsibilities among member states beyond that established under the EU 
Dublin Regulation. Because negotiations of the above-mentioned seven CEAS 
legislative proposals have taken a ‘package approach’ from the outset, some of 
the other proposals where inter-institutional decision making progress has been 
achieved are currently stuck in negotiations. 
3.2.3 EASO: Towards an EU Asylum Agency  
This has been the case for instance regarding the new mandate of the European 
Asylum Support Office (EASO) located in Valetta (Malta). The Commission 
presented an important initiative with a clear potential for making important 
practical contributions on the ground in the sharing of responsibility and 
solidarity with EU member states maintaining common Schengen external 
borders.91 The Commission proposed reforming EASO into an EU Asylum 
Agency that would not only support and participate in assessing asylum claims 
along with member state national authorities, but also contribute to the 
monitoring of the domestic implementation of EU asylum standards and 
ensuring higher accountability of ongoing EASO operational activities in 
countries like Greece.92 
EASO’s involvement in conducting ‘admissibility interviews’ of asylum 
seekers in the hotspots on the Greek islands has been subject to complaints 
highlighting that they have fallen outside its current official mandate and have 
failed to comply with procedural guarantees and the right to be heard in Art. 41 
EUCFR.93 
                                                        
91 Sergio Carrera and Karel Lannoo (2018), “We’re in this boat together: Time for a Migration 
Union”, CEPS, Brussels, 22 June (https://www.ceps.eu/publications/were-boat-together-
time-migration-union). 
92 Papadopoulou, op.cit.  
93 While the European Ombudsman concluded that the responsibility for decisions on 
individual asylum applications lies with the Greek authorities, it did accept that complaints 
by some civil society actors raised “genuine concerns about the extent of the involvement of 
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The Commission recommended de-linking negotiations on the EU 
Asylum Agency with the recast CEAS proposals addressed in Section 3.2.2 
above.94 In the above-mentioned State of Union Speech of 18 September 2018, 
Juncker advanced a new proposal amending the previous one that aims at 
converting EASO into an EU Asylum Agency.95 The new proposal aims at 
strengthening the financial means of the agency so as to reinforce its technical 
and operational assistance to member states. Among others, it also envisages 
that it would have the competence to provide administrative assistance to 
national asylum authorities in carrying out a full or partial examination of 
asylum applications,96 assisting or coordinating the setting up of reception 
conditions and facilities and member states’ operational implementation of the 
EU Dublin procedure with the domestic deployment of ‘asylum support teams’.  
                                                        
EASO personnel…and about the quality of, and procedural fairness in, the conduct of 
admissibility interviews”. European Ombudsman (2018), Decision in case 735/2017/MDC on 
the European Asylum Support Office’s (EASO) involvement in the decision-making process 
concerning admissibility of applications for international protection submitted in Greek 
Hotspots, in particular shortcomings in admissibility interviews, 5 July 2018. 
94 European Commission (2017a), op.cit. 
95 Council of the European Union (2018), Amended proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the European Union Agency for Asylum and repealing 
Regulation (EU) No 439/2010 - A contribution from the European Commission to the Leaders’ 
meeting in Salzburg on 19-20 September 2018, ST 12112 2018 INIT, Interinstitutional File: 
2016/0131(COD), ASILE 59, CSC 253, CODEC 1459, Brussels, 13 September 
(https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-eu-agency-asylum-
regulation-633_en.pdf). 
96 Refer to the proposed revision of Art. 16.2.d of the Commission proposal which states that 
“The Agency shall organise and coordinate, for a limited period of time, the appropriate 
operational and technical assistance which may entail taking one or more of the following 
operational and technical measures in full respect of fundamental rights: (d) facilitate assist 
with the examination of applications for international protection that are under examination 
by the competent national authorities or provide them with other necessary assistance in the 
procedure for international protection, in particular by; (i) assisting with or carrying out the 
admissibility interview and the substantive interview, as applicable, and the interview for 
determining the Member State responsible; (ii) registering the application for international 
protection in the automated system referred to in Dublin Regulation; (c) provide assistance to 
competent national authorities responsible for the examination of the application for 
international protection; (iii) assisting with the provision of information to applicants on the 
procedure for international protection procedure and with regard to reception conditions as 
appropriate; (iv) assisting with the provision of information on allocation and providing the 
necessary assistance to applicants that could be subject to allocation”. 
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3.3 Legal Immigration 
President Juncker expressly stated in his “A New Start for Europe” Political 
Guidelines that:  
I want to promote a new European policy on legal migration. Such a 
policy could help us to address shortages of specific skills and attract 
talent to better cope with the demographic challenges of the European 
Union. I want Europe to become at least as attractive as the favourite 
migration destinations such as Australia, Canada and the USA. As a 
first step, I intend to review the ‘Blue Card’ legislation and its 
unsatisfactory state of implementation. 
Previous CEPS research97 showed that the current 2009 EU Blue Card 
regime,98 aimed at easing the conditions of entry and residence for third country 
highly qualified workers and their family members in the Union, has at times 
not been working effectively in practice. Very few EU Blue Cards99 have been 
issued by EU member states since the regime came into existence, due to a 
number of factors.100 Among others: first, its rather restrictive conditions for 
admission (including high salary thresholds) and for intra-EU mobility (the 
right, once having being granted EU blue card status, to move with family 
members to a second EU member state); second, the option for national 
governments to continue using their parallel national schemes for entry, 
residence and work of highly qualified third country nationals.  
                                                        
97 Katharina Eisele (2013), “Why come here if I can go there? Assessing the ‘Attractiveness’ of 
the EU’s Blue Card Directive for ‘Highly Qualified’ Immigrants”, CEPS Paper in Liberty and 
Security, CEPS, Brussels, No. 60, October (https://www.ceps.eu/system/ 
files/No%2060%20Eisele%20EU%20Blue%20Card%20Directive_0.pdf). 
98 Council of the European Union (2009), Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on 
the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly 
qualified employment, L155/1, 18.6.2009 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ 
TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32009L0050&from=EN). 
99 European Commission (2016), “Questions and Answers: An improved EU Blue Card 
scheme and the Action Plan on Integration”, European Commission Fact Sheet, Strasbourg, 7 
June (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-2071_en.htm). 
100 European Commission (2014), Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council on the implementation of Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions 
of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of highly qualified 
employment (“EU Blue Card”), COM(2014) 287 final Brussels, 22 May (https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0287&from=EN). 
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This was also highlighted by Commissioner Avramopoulos in his 
hearing101 as Commissioner-designate before the European Parliament in 
September 2014, where he stated that:  
The first years of implementation of the ‘Blue Card Directive’ has 
shown several shortcomings, such as the existence of competing, 
parallel national schemes, which create fragmentation and uncertainty 
and hold back the potential of the legislation to attract talent. Moreover, 
highly qualified migrants look at the EU as a whole, just like the US, 
Canada and Australia: we therefore need to ensure that the intra-EU 
mobility scheme is an attractive option, facilitating circulation of talents 
and skills within the EU. 
The Commission announced the envisaged reform of the EU Blue Card 
Directive in June 2016,102 and presented a new legislative proposal103 reforming 
the current outlines of the older EU Blue Card Directive. In contrast to other 
crisis-related initiatives, the proposal followed EU Better Regulation guidelines 
and toolbox ‘to the letter’. A key ‘promise’ and welcome contribution by the 
Commission in this new proposal was the much-needed abolition of parallel 
national schemes for the highly-skilled in member states and the setting up of a 
single EU-wide scheme.  
The re-cast Directive came with an impressive Impact Assessment,104 
closely following EU Better Regulation guidelines and carefully taking existing 
                                                        
101European Parliament (2014), “Hearing with Dimitris Avramopoulos”, organized by the 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs, Day 2: 30 September 2014 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings-2014/en/schedule/30-09-2014/dimitris-
avramopoulos/). 
102 European Commission (2016), “Delivering the European Agenda on Migration: 
Commission presents Action Plan on Integration and reforms 'Blue Card' scheme for highly 
skilled workers from outside the EU”, European Commission Press release, Strasbourg, 7 
June. (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2041_en.htm). 
103 European Commission (2016), Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the 
purposes of highly skilled employment {SWD(2016) 193 final} {SWD(2016) 194 final}, 




104 European Commission (2018), Commission staff working document executive summary of 
the impact assessment Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on European Crowdfunding Service Providers 
(ECSP) for Business and Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Directive 2014/65/EU on markets in financial instruments {COM(2018) 
113 final} - {COM(2018) 99 final} - {SWD(2018) 56 final}, SWD(2018) 57 final, Brussels, 8 March. 
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evidence and research into consideration, and justifying preferred policy 
options for reforming the EU Blue Card model. As recognised by the 
Commission’s September 2018 Communication,105 Enhancing Legal Pathways 
to Europe, the inter-institutional negotiations on the proposal are stalled, which, 
while having support from the European Parliament, have encountered fierce 
resistance from some EU member states, in particular regarding the abolition of 
parallel national schemes. 
Commissioner Avramopoulos committed himself before the European 
Parliament to “set European rules so as to clarify legal pathways for all 
categories of workers that seek to reach the continent.”106 It is by and large 
unclear exactly how this wider priority has been really implemented in practice.  
The Commission has slowly advanced on the revision of common EU 
rules covering the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals 
for purposes of work and studies in the EU. The revisions bring a clear potential 
for EU value added, especially in relation to their higher set of common 
standards of protection, facilitated conditions for entry and residence and 
provisions facilitating intra-EU mobility.107 This was for instance the case in 
relation to a re-cast Directive for students and researchers (on the conditions of 
entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of research, 
studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes or educational 
projects and au pairing) in May 2016.108  
The European Agenda on Migration also talked about the need for the 
Union to modernise the common visa policy and referred to the previous 
Barroso Commission’s Proposals for establishing an EU Touring Visa.109 Despite 
                                                        
(http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/10102/2018/EN/SWD-2018-57-F1-EN-
MAIN-PART-1.PDF) 
105 European Commission (2018), Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council Enhancing legal pathways to Europe: an indispensable part of a 
balanced and comprehensive migration policy A contribution from the European 
Commission to the Leaders’ meeting in Salzburg on 19-20 September 2018, COM(2018) 635 
final, Brussels, 12 September (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/ 
PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0635&from=EN). 
106 Hearing Dimitris Avramopoulos (2014), op.cit. 
107 European Commission (2014), Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council on the implementation of Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions 
of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of highly qualified 
employment (“EU Blue Card”), COM(2014) 287 final Brussels, 22 May (https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0287&from=EN). 
108 Ibid. 
109 European Commission, proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Union Code on Visas (Visa Code), COM(2014) 164, 1 April 2014; and proposal 
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its call for their adoption, and in light of diverging views in the Council, the 
Commission and the European Parliament, which mainly related to the Council 
and Commission’s opposition to include humanitarian visas in the EU Visa 
Code, the Commission withdrew the former proposals110 and published a new 
one in March 2018,111 where the previously suggested EU Touring Visa 
disappeared. In another difference from the previous Commission proposal, the 
Juncker Commission initiative linked facilitated visa provisions to 
‘conditionality’ on migration management by relevant or selected third 
countries and as “leverage in EU readmission policy”.112  
Therefore, the promises of the European Agenda on Migration have not 
been delivered, and neither has the European Parliament call for the Union to 
legislate on humanitarian visas been fulfilled. On 6 December 2018, the 
European Parliament adopted a Report on the Commission proposal restating 
the need for the EU to establish “new safe and legal access arrangements for 
migrants and refugees seeking to come to Europe” and the development of a 
common legal framework for humanitarian visas as part of the EU Visa Code.113 
The Parliament recommended reincorporating the concept of a ‘Touring Visa’. 
It also underlined the need to reduce or waive the envisaged time limits required 
by EU member state consulates abroad for the submission of visa applications 
in “justified individual cases of urgency, including when it is necessary on 
                                                        
for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a touring visa and 
amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and Regulations (EC) No 
562/2006 and (EC) No 767/2008, COM(2014) 163, 1 April 2014. 
110 European Commission (2018), Commission Work Programme 2018 An agenda for a more 
united, stronger and more democratic Europe, Strasbourg, 24.10.2017 COM(2017) 650 final 
(https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/cwp_2018_en.pdf). 
111 European Commission (2018), Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 
810/2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code), Brussels, 14.3.2018 
COM(2018) 252 final 2018/0061 (COD) (https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/ 
homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/201780314_proposal-
regulation-establishing-community-code-visas_en.pdf). 
112 The Commission Proposal links EU visa policy to “ensure a better balance between 
migration and security concerns, economic considerations and general external relations.” See 
Recital (2) and Art. 25a of the proposal. 
113 European Parliament, Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 establishing a Community Code 
on Visas (Visa Code) (COM(2018)0252 – C8-0114/2018 – 2018/0061(COD)) Committee on 
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Rapporteur: Juan Fernando López Aguilar, 6.12.2018 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A8-2018-0434+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN). 
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professional grounds, on humanitarian grounds, for reasons of national interest 
or because of international obligations”.114 
The current EU legal immigration acquis is still characterised by systemic 
fragmentation, legal uncertainty and multi-layered migratory statuses across the 
Union.115 CEPS research has showed how these features lead to incoherence, 
obscurity regarding which rules apply to whom, and discrimination towards 
certain foreign workers regarding fair working and living conditions in line with 
those enshrined in international human rights and labour standards such as 
those adopted under the International Labour Organisation (ILO).116 The 
Commission announced it would address and examine these issues in a ‘Fitness 
Check’ on the existing legal acquis on regular immigration. This is still ongoing 
and expected to appear sometime during the first half of 2019.117 
3.4 Irregular entries and third-country cooperation on expulsions 
3.4.1 EU-Turkey Statement and the Facility for Refugees  
One of the most visible and controversial developments here was the so-called 
‘EU-Turkey Statement’ or deal of March 2016.118 The Statement came in the form 
of a political declaration and press release setting up the operative framework 
under which asylum seekers having entered Greece via Turkey would be 
returned to the latter. Furthermore, Turkey agreed to take back every irregular 
migrant intercepted in its waters and step up cooperation to prevent irregular 
entries into the Schengen territory. The Statement also included the so-called 
‘one-for-one’ deal, according to which for every Syrian returned from Greece to 
Turkey, another would be resettled from Turkey to the EU. 
Despite being often politically portrayed as an ‘EU-product’ and even as 
a ‘model’ for future European cooperation with third countries on migration, we 
only learned later on that ‘the EU’ had in fact nothing to do it, neither the 
European Commission or even the European Council. In response to a direct 
                                                        
114 Refer to proposed Parliament amendment of Article 1.1.7 of the proposal. 
115 Sergio Carrera, Andrew Geddes, Elspeth Guild and Marco Stefan (2017), Pathways towards 
Legal Migration into the EU: Reappraising concepts, trajectories and policies, CEPS, Brussels 
(https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/PathwaysLegalMigration_0.pdf) 
116 Ibid. 
117 European Commission, “Evaluation and fitness check (fc) roadmap” 
(http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/docs/2016_home_199_fitnesscheck_ 
legal_migration_en.pdf). 
118 Council of EU (2016), EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016, Press Release 144/16, 18 March 
(https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-
statement/pdf). 
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action presented by some asylum seekers who were affected by the 
implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, and despite some obvious 
references to the EU in relevant Press Releases proclaiming the Statement and 
the Commission participating in the negotiations preceding the ‘deal’,119 both 
the General Court120 and later on the Court of Justice121 surprisingly confirmed 
that the Statement’s authorship belonged to the Heads of Government and State 
of EU member states, not to any EU actor at all. It qualifies as an ‘extra-Treaty 
instrument.’ 
Determining the authorship of the Statement was central at times for 
determining responsibilities for the human rights violations that have been 
inherent in its operationalisation on the ground, not least on the various Greek 
islands with ‘hotspots’ and where a geographical limitation preventing asylum 
seekers from going to Greece’s mainland has been in force as a result of the 
Statement.122 EU member states strategically chose to evade the EU Treaties and 
European law, as well as the European institutions, when negotiating the deal 
with Turkish Government. This meant that they successfully evaded and side-
lined the role of the European Commission envisaged in the Treaties, the 
democratic scrutiny of the European Parliament and judicial control by the 
Luxembourg Court in an area of shared and even exclusive EU competence.  
As the European Ombudsman concluded in a Joint Inquiry issued on 
January 2017,123 irrespective of the actual legal or political nature of the 
Statement, EU institutions and agencies have been central in its practical 
                                                        
119 Sergio Carrera, Leonhard den Hertog and Marco Stefan (2017), “It wasn’t me! The 
Luxembourg Court Orders on the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal”, CEPS, Brussels, No 2017-15, 
April (https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/EU-Turkey%20Deal.pdf). 
120 General Court of the European Union (2017), The General Court declares that it lacks 
jurisdiction to hear and determine the actions brought by three asylum seekers against the 
EU-Turkey statement which seeks to resolve the migration crisis, Orders of the General Court 
in Cases T-192/16, T-193/16 and T-257/16 NF, NG and NM v European Council, Press 
Release No 19/17, Luxembourg, 28 February (https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/ 
docs/application/pdf/2017-02/cp170019en.pdf). 
121Court of the European Union (2018), Order of the Court (First Chamber) In Joined Cases 




122Danish Refugee Council (2017), “Fundamental Rights and the EU Hotspot Approach”, 
October (https://drc.ngo/media/4051855/fundamental-rights_web.pdf). 
123 European Ombudsman (2017), “Ombudsman: EU must continue to assess human rights 
impact of EU-Turkey deal”, Case 506/2016/MHZ, Press release no. 1/2017, 19 January 
(https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/press-release/en/75136). 
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implementation,124 including the European Commission,125 and the latter should 
secure robust human rights impact assessments of the Statement.  
The Commission was indirectly complicit in the entire affair and 
conclusion of the Statement and has played a key role in its implementation. It 
presented the Statement as a ‘game changer’ in decreasing the number of asylum 
seeker arrivals and daily crossings to the Greek islands to pre-crisis numbers.126 
Vice-President Timmermans insisted on that point before the European 
Parliament in 2016 and stated that “the agreement with Turkey in my view is 
the only way forward to solve that problem. Those who criticise the agreement 
have never presented an alternative”.127 The progressive decrease in the number 
of irregular entries since 2016 cannot solely be attributed to the EU-Turkey 
Statement. A similar extra-Treaty way of decision-making was evident in the 
Balkans Route Statement, which effectively meant the closure of borders for 
asylum seekers, and in some cases the erection of new border fences and walls 
by countries like Macedonia or Hungary.  
That notwithstanding, a key challenge characterising the Statement right 
from the start has been its uneasy relationship with the rule of law and 
fundamental rights. The political framing by the Commission of Turkey as a 
‘safe third country’ for asylum seekers and refugees, and the high degree of 
pressure128 that it has put on the Greek authorities to carry out expedited or 
                                                        
124 European Commission, “Operational implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement”, 
European Commission Press Release (https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/ 
homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/press-
material/docs/state_of_play_-_eu-turkey_en.pdf). 
125European Commission (2016), “Managing the Refugee Crisis: Commission reports on 
progress made in the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement”, European Commission 
Press release, Brussels, 15 June (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2181_en.htm). 
126European Commission (2018), “EU-Turkey Statement: Two years on”, Press Release, April 
(https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20180314_eu-turkey-two-years-on_en.pdf). 
127 First Vice-President Timmermans (2016), “Remarks by First Vice-President Timmermans – 
European Parliament Plenary Debate 28 April 2016 – Council and Commission statements on 
the legal aspects, democratic control and implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement”, 
European Commission Statement, Council and Commission statements on the legal aspects, 
democratic control and implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement, Remarks by First Vice-




128 European Commission (2016), Annex 1 to the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the European Council and the Council on the Fourth Report on the 
Progress made in the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, COM(2016) 792 final, 
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accelerated returns of asylum seekers, including vulnerable groups, to Turkey, 
have generated a great deal of concern. The Greek asylum appeal bodies have 
disagreed with Turkey being ‘safe’ and rejected the sending back of asylum 
seekers.  
The lack of safety of Turkey for refugees is not only based on the 
irrefutable fact that the country is not bound by the 1967 Protocol to the United 
Nations Geneva Convention on Refugees129 and refuses to recognise full refugee 
status for non-European asylum seekers, and thereby all the rights, security of 
residence and family life guarantees that the UN definition grants to 
beneficiaries. The non-practical delivery of human rights in the country has been 
also widely documented and corroborated.130 
Furthermore, the Statement came with two tranches of 3 billion Euros for 
Turkey by the EU under the so-called ‘EU Facility for Refugees’.131 The European 
Court of Auditors (ECA), which published a Special Report on the Facility for 
Refugees in Turkey,132 has provided solid evidence on the lack of clarity of 
where EU funding – including pre-accession assistance133 – has really gone to 
and the extent to which the Facility for Refugee’s objectives have been actually 
met in practice. This has been the case in particular due to factors such as “the 
Turkish authorities’ refusal to grant access to beneficiary data for cash-assistance 
projects”, and not enough investment being given to municipal infrastructures 
and socio-economic support in the country, which are key for effective access to 
                                                        




129Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild (2016), “EU-Turkey plan for handling refugees is fraught 
with legal and procedural challenges”, CEPS, Brussels, 10 March (https://www.ceps.eu/ 
publications/eu-turkey-plan-handling-refugees-fraught-legal-and-procedural-challenges). 
130 Amnesty International (2017), “A Blueprint for despair Human Rights impact of the EU-
Turkey Deal” (https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR2556642 
017ENGLISH.PDF). 




132 European Court of Auditors (2018), “Special Report the Facility for Refugees in Turkey: 
helpful support, but improvements needed to deliver more value for money”, No. 27 
(https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR18_27/SR_TRF_EN.pdf). 
133 European Court of Auditors (2018), “Special Report EU pre-accession assistance to Turkey: 
Only limited results so far”, No. 07 (https://www.eca.europa.eu/ 
Lists/ECADocuments/SR18_07/SR_TURKEY_EN.pdf). 
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social assistance, housing, healthcare, work and education, key conditions for 
any country to be considered ‘safe’ for refugees, and which Turkey simply does 
not meet.  
The EU-Turkey Statement leaves EU member states and European 
institutions and agencies in a high level of dependency on Turkish authorities 
and a regime actively undermining the rule of law and civil liberties.134 More 
generally, using money as an incentive for cooperation on readmission of 
asylum seekers irregularly entering the EU creates expectations for any other 
third countries – such as in Africa – regarding the price tag that will be attached 
and who is going to pay the next bill. 
3.4.2 Readmission and root causes 
The Juncker Commission set as one of its emblematic priorities the ‘expulsions 
dimension’ of irregular immigration management, both as regards the call for 
EU member states to increase expulsion rates, as well as the need for third 
countries to cooperate in the readmission in addition to their own nationals of 
irregular third-country nationals entering the EU through their territory, in 
particular from Africa and the Middle East. 
The long-standing difficulties experienced by this and all previous 
Commissions to persuade non-EU countries to sign EU Readmission 
Agreements (EURAs), and – once concluded – ensuring their usability and 
practical implementation has been notoriously difficult. The ‘European refugee 
humanitarian crisis’ gave new political impetus to the EU readmission agenda. 
The role of third-country cooperation in increasing ‘return rates’ of irregular 
immigrants was framed as one of the highest EU priorities. 
While informal methods of cooperation were already in use before the 
2015 humanitarian crisis, the latter functioned as a catalyst for the Commission 
in justifying the development of their use. Since 2015, the Commission – in 
cooperation with the External Action Service (EAS) and some member state 
governments – has developed crisis-driven policy and financial tools with the 
purpose of facilitating third-country cooperation with the EU on readmission 
and addressing the so-called “root causes of irregular immigration”.  
The European Agenda on Migration identified third-country cooperation 
as a key priority area under its Pillar dealing with “Reducing the incentives for 
irregular migration”. It framed the ‘root causes approach’ also from a migration 
management or security angle by arguing that “Migration should be recognised 
                                                        
134 Council of Europe (2017), “110th PLENARY - Turkey - Proposed constitutional 
amendments “dangerous step backwards” for democracy”, 10 March 
(https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/events/?id=2369). 
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as one of the primary areas [in] an active and engaged EU external policy…civil 
war, persecution, poverty and climate change all feed directly and immediately 
into migration, so the prevention and mitigation of these threats is of primary 
importance for the migration debate”.135  
These policy priorities have materialised in the further development of old 
and new policy or ‘political’ instruments or ‘practical cooperation arrangements’ 
such as ‘Common Agendas on Migration and Mobility’ (CAMM), High Level 
Migration Dialogues, Joint Declarations as well as Joint Way Forward. They all 
share close ties to the implementation of the political agenda laid down in the 
2016 EU Partnership Framework with Third Countries under the European 
Agenda on Migration, which identified the following ‘priority partnership 
countries’: Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali and Ethiopia. Another example is the 
so-called Joint Way Forward (JWF) on migration issues between Afghanistan 
and the EU136, where the EEAS137 has also participated. 
EURAs constitute international agreements where the EU has recognised 
legal competence in the EU Treaties.138 They provide common operational 
procedures and administrative rules for the swift identification (and means of 
evidence) of ‘migrants to be readmitted’ and the issuing of travel documents 
(laissez-passer) for their expulsion. In contrast, ‘readmission arrangements’ are 
instruments or tools not formally qualifying as EURAs, which are instead 
officially presented as non-legally binding or practical/operational (presented 
as ‘technical’) in nature.  
African countries have persistently hesitated and expressed disagreement 
on the EU’s readmission priority.139 The ‘crisis’ also provided new political 
grounds for the EU to persist in and re-visit pre-existing EU prioritisation on 
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readmission in external policies with Africa, which was once more not received 
very warmly by the African governments concerned. This was reflected in the 
Valletta Summit on Migration held the 11 and 12 November 2015 in Malta. The 
Summit was chaired by European Council President Donald Tusk, and brought 
together EU and African Heads of States and Governments as well as 
representatives from the African Union, ECOWAS and the UN. The Summit, 
and the Joint Action Plan which followed, gave special salience to re-boosting 
third-country cooperation in a number of areas including readmission. 
The Valletta Summit, and its difficult implementation through the Joint 
Plan, constitutes a visible example of a failing migration-control policy approach 
when the European Commission and the EEAS have gone abroad, including the 
so-called ‘EU Migration Compacts’. The North African governments’ response 
to various attempts coming from these and other EU actors calling for 
readmission and safe third country notions has been of long-standing and 
persistent lack of support. The Valetta Summit once more made evident how 
African representatives saw a lack of real dialogue – but rather a ‘monologue’ – 
between the EU and its African counterparts, with the EU yet again seeking to 
impose its own ‘more-for-more’ conditionality approach and accelerate 
expulsions at all costs. 
This European Commission has promoted and implemented the use of 
non-legally binding instruments140 in the domain of EU readmission policy. 
Their blurred legally binding nature – and the fact that the parties are not legally 
bound to follow the terms of cooperation set out in these arrangements – 
increases the uncertainty and predictability of readmission procedures. There 
are no meaningful ways to ensure the compliance of their provisions by the 
states party due to their lack of enforceability. Also, the documents laying down 
or listing the concrete set of actions and projects implemented and funded 
remain confidential and are not disclosed to the public, which entirely prevents 
much-needed financial, democratic and legal accountability. 
Research has showed that the increasing use of non-legally binding 
‘readmission arrangements’ has not helped in making cooperation easier, nor 
has it increased the number of enforced returns to the relevant African 
countries.141 EU readmission arrangements have on the other hand left the door 
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open for bilateral interests between member states and specific ‘priority 
countries’. In this way, their use can be expected to re-inject ‘bilateralism’ and 
specific national agendas into a policy area falling under EU competence. 
Moreover, they hijack democratic scrutiny by the European Parliament, which 
has the power of ‘consent’ in international agreements in light of the Lisbon 
Treaty. 
The implementation of EU Readmission Arrangements has been closely 
tied to the use of extra-budget and emergency-led EU funding instruments, 
chiefly the so-called ‘EU Trust Funds’ (EUTF).142 The EUTF with Africa has for 
instance shown how the linkage between the EUTF and the EU Migration 
Partnership Framework143 launched by the Commission in 2016144 has enabled 
the ‘more-for-more’ conditionality approach on migration in the area of 
readmission with relevant African governments. The case of Ethiopia, for 
example, illustrates how EU funding aims at functioning as a key ‘enabler’ in 
the implementation of the political agenda in the EU Partnership, with 
somewhat mixed results on its effectiveness.145 Similarly to the readmission 
arrangements, the fact that EUTFs are ‘extra-budget’ severely undermines 
budgetary control by the European Parliament.146  
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3.4.3 Returns  
The EU has its own return policy under the umbrella of the EU Return Directive 
2008/115.147 Increasing ‘the effectiveness’ of EU irregular immigration policies, 
particularly by increasing the enforcement rate of expulsions of irregular 
immigrants and asylum seekers has become one of the most visible political 
priorities of this Commission. On repeated occasions, a gap between ‘return 
orders issued’ and the total of enforced expulsions has been highlighted.148  
The European Agenda on Migration (COM(2015)240)149 declared that 
“one of the incentives for irregular migration is the knowledge that the EU’s 
system to return irregular migrants is not sufficiently effective”. Similarly, in 
2015, the Commission published a Communication on an EU Action Plan on 
return (COM(2015)453),150 which underlined that during 2014 “less than 40% of 
the irregular migrants that were ordered to leave the EU departed effectively” 
and therefore called for the “systematic return, either voluntary or forced, of 
those who do not or no longer have the right to remain in Europe”. Vice-
President Timmermans expressly stated151 that “Everyone who needs sanctuary 
should find it in Europe. But those who have no justified claim should be quickly 
identified and returned to their home country”. 
The transformation of Frontex into a EBCG has also meant granting the 
agency with an increased operational role in expulsions, which comes alongside 
similarly high expectations for its task in increasing expulsions rates. In 
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addition, President Juncker announced in his September 2018 State of the Union 
address before the European Parliament the presentation of revised EU rules on 
returns of irregular immigrants. The Commission adopted a new proposal 
recasting the EU Return Directive, which aims at increasing the enforcement of 
return decisions.152  
This proposal will not solve current legal, judicial and practical issues 
which stand in the way of enforcement of removals in the EU.153 Most of these 
are inherently constitutive to the obligation to ensure effective remedies and 
legal protection to the individuals involved, and the specificities of national, 
regional and local landscapes of the actors involved. The fact that the 
Commission has proposed it without an Impact Assessment of its value and 
potential fundamental rights violations constitutes another example of non-
compliance with EU Better Regulation guidelines, which require justification of 
proportionality, subsidiarity and proof of compliance with the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. 
 Moreover, the proposal has been subject to profound concerns154 from 90 
civil society organisations issuing a statement155 highlighting that, if adopted, 
the proposal will actually create more harm and suffering. If adopted, the 
Directive would lead to more unlawful detention of migrants and asylum 
seekers, including vulnerable categories, which defeats the very purpose of 
‘effective expulsions’, and neglects the high risks of fundamental rights 
violations resulting from accelerated border procedures, which are most 
worrying in light of the ineffective or inexistent complaint mechanisms at 
domestic levels across the Union (Refer to Section 3.1.1 on the EBCG above). 
3.4.4 Migrant smuggling 
The dismantling of the so-called ‘business model’ of migrant smugglers in the 
EU has been another key political priority for the Juncker Commission.156 The 
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European Agenda on Migration identified “the targeting of criminal smuggling 
networks” as an area for ‘immediate action’.157 The refugee crisis gave even 
further impetus to this political priority and placed it at the top of both the 
Commission’s migration and security agendas. 
Before the crisis, the EU already had a legislative framework criminalising 
the facilitation of irregular entry, transit and residence in the EU in the form of 
the so-called EU Facilitators Package, a pre-Lisbon Treaty framework adopted 
in November 2002, and which is composed of Council Directive 2002/90/EC 
defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence (the 
‘Directive’) and Council Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA on the 
strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised 
entry, transit and residence (the ‘Framework Decision’).158 The Commission’s 
European Agenda on Migration promised that “the Commission will improve 
the existing EU legal framework to tackle migrant smuggling and those who 
profit from it”.159 This policy objective has not been accomplished. 
CEPS research160 underlined the need for the Commission to reform the 
Facilitators Package due to its embedded legal uncertainty regarding legitimate 
provision of humanitarian assistance by civil society actors, volunteers and 
citizens to asylum seekers and irregular immigrants. Specifically, Art. 1.2 of the 
Facilitation Directive offers member states the option to exempt or not from 
criminalisation individuals or organisations providing assistance which is 
humanitarian in nature. On the basis of this ambiguity, academic research has 
provided evidence of instances where civil society actors have been sanctioned, 
criminalised or policed in some EU member states, as well as a generalised 
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chilling or deterrent effect for NGOs working to provide legal aid, access to 
services and advocacy on fundamental rights to third country nationals.161  
The Commission carried out a REFIT (Regulatory Fitness and 
Performance Programme) on the implementation of the EU Facilitators Package 
which was published in March 2017.162 Despite the wealth of evidence to the 
contrary, the Commission surprisingly concluded that “there is no sufficient 
evidence to draw firm conclusions about the need for a revision of the 
Facilitators Package at this point in time.” It added that “a reinforced exchange 
of knowledge and good practice between prosecutors, law enforcement and civil 
society could contribute to improving the current situation and avoid 
criminalisation of genuine humanitarian assistance.”163 
Furthermore, during the term of office of the Juncker Commission we 
have witnessed a proliferation of border and non-border management related 
agencies and actors involved in the design and implementation of EU anti-
smuggling policies in the Mediterranean Sea. Anti-smuggling policies have been 
re-framed as ‘migration-management’ responses to prevent irregular entries in 
the EU, with an increasing number of transnational actors and EU funding being 
deployed in their implementation. In its 2015-2020 EU Action Plan against 
migrant smuggling (May 2015),164 the Commission proposed the need to 
increase EU Agencies competences in supporting EU member states in the 
investigation and prosecution of migrant smuggling networks and called for a 
‘multi-agency approach’.  
As developed in Section 3.2.1 above (Relocation and hotspots), EU home 
affairs agencies such as Europol and Eurojust were progressively deployed in 
the hotspots in Greece and Italy helping to “identify smugglers, investigate 
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them, prosecute them, freeze and confiscate their assets”.165 In addition, Europol 
has not only been granted an expanded maritime operational activities focused 
on information exchange to dismantle ‘smuggling networks’ from Turkey, Libya 
and other African countries.166 It was also given a new ‘European Migrant 
Smuggling Centre’ (EMSC) in February 2016, which aims at “proactively 
supporting EU member states in dismantling criminal networks involved in 
organised migrant smuggling”.167 
The Commission’s Action Plan added that the proposed actions “should 
be seen in connection with on-going work to establish a Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP)” so as to address human smuggling. This constituted a 
direct invitation for defence and military actors to become actively involved in 
the EU’s responses to the refugee humanitarian crisis. The most important 
development implementing this call was the setting up of EUNAVFOR-MED 
Operation (‘Operation Sophia’168) which, under the leadership of the Vice-
President of the Commission and High Representative Mogherini (EEAS), 
started in May 2015.  
The operation was originally given an international legal mandate to 
intercept, inspect, seize and destroy vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya 
for a period of one year in cases where there are ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ 
that these vessels, inflatable boats, rafts and dinghies are being used for 
smuggling and human trafficking (UN Resolution 2240 (2015)).169 In June 
2016,170 Operation Sophia’s mandate was extended for another year and two 
new tasks were added: training Libyan coastguards and contributing to the 
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implementation of the UN arms embargo in the high seas (UN Resolution 2291 
(2016)).171 
In July 2017, the Operation’s lifetime was extended until December 
2018,172 which was recommended to be extended for a further 18 months,173 
pursuing the development of the EU Trust Fund (EUTF) project174 started in July 
2017 for “strengthening the operational capacities of the Libyan coast guards” 
and setting up the Libyan Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre, with the Italian 
authorities (as one of the key implementers of the project) and Libyan 
stakeholders. A Joint Communication between the European Commission and 
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 
January 2017 laid down in a rather transparent manner the key role played by 
Operation Sophia and the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM), in 
‘supporting’ Libyan Coast Guard capacity to prevent smugglers from operating 
and “to have the capacity to better manage maritime border and ensure safe 
disembarkation on the Libyan coast.”175 
The effectiveness and proportionality of Operation Sophia has been 
subject to much discussion.176 Not least in light of its contribution towards the 
militarisation of EU’s border surveillance and irregular immigration policy and 
the increasing focus on ‘information exchange’ in countering human 
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smuggling.177 This comes alongside the still unresolved and ongoing conflict in 
the country, which makes the existence of central government and clearly 
identifiable border and coast guard authorities illusory. The UK House of Lords 
(2015) concluded that there remain significant gaps in the operation’s 
understanding of smuggling networks and their modus operandi in Libya.178 The 
operation’s objectives in countering ‘crime’ have by and large exceeded what 
could be realistically expected from such a military operation.179 
It is also noticeable that the main mandate of Operation Sophia has not 
been search and rescue (SAR) at sea. Its contribution to the SAR gap in the central 
Mediterranean has been negligible. The role that it has played in confiscating 
and destroying boats and making sea journeys more dangerous, the training of 
various Libyan coast guard actors180 and increasing SAR capacity in Libya have 
been equally controversial. Preventing asylum seekers and immigrants from 
leaving Libyan waters violates the non-refoulement principle, as a wealth of 
evidence exists that they can be expected to experience indefinite detention, 
torture and other ill-treatment in centres that are unsuitable for human 
habitation.181  
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3.5 Criminal justice and police cooperation 
EU competence on security and criminal justice cooperation has gone through a 
widening in reach and scope since the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. The latter brought 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation under Title V, 
“Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”. For the first time in European 
integration, these policy domains were transferred to shared legal competence 
between the Union and the member states. 
For a period of four years since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 
2009, however, Protocol 36 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) limited 
the ordinary enforcement powers of the European Commission to scrutinise and 
follow up member states for timely and correct implementation of EU criminal 
justice and policing laws.182 This transitional period came to an end in December 
2014 with the new Juncker Commission team. Vice-President Timmermans 
declared that “Justice and Home Affairs policies are finally set on an equal footing with 
other EU policies. This is a step forward in making them more transparent and 
democratic.”183 Since then, the Commission acquired a key role in ‘monitoring 
trust’ in the EU criminal justice area.184 
3.5.1 European Public Prosecutor’s Office 
A major development during the reporting period has been the setting up of the 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in October 2017.185 This was 
highlighted as a key priority by Commissioner Jourová during her hearing 
before the LIBE Committee of the Parliament as Commissioner-designate on 1 
October 2014, when she declared that “In the area of judicial cooperation in 
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criminal matters, I intend to prioritise the establishment of an independent and 
efficient European Public Prosecutor’s Office by 2016.”186 
The EPPO constitutes an ambitious achievement. It grants the EU the first 
Union body having the power to investigate and prosecute crimes against the 
financial interests of the EU (PIF offences).187 The original Commission initiative 
presented back in 2013 proposed an innovative and centralised EPPO model. 
After arduous negotiations among EU member states, it was finally adopted 
under ‘enhanced cooperation’ in light of Art. 86.1 TFEU. So far, 22 member states 
are participating in the EPPO.188  
The final EPPO configurations were significantly watered down into an 
intergovernmental body during the negotiations inside the Council.189 It is 
expected to start operating by the end of 2020, and it will be set up in 
Luxembourg. During the last State of the Union address delivered in the 
European Parliament in September 2018, President Juncker announced a new 
Commission proposal to extend the EPPO mandate to include the fight against 
terrorist offences affecting more than one member state.190 
The EPPO’s procedural effectiveness will be a key issue due to its very 
complex, multi-level organisation and decentralised structure.191 Despite the fact 
the EPPO is to be formally independent, similarly to the Frontex (EBCG) Agency 
as has been highlighted above, its structure, membership and decision powers 
will be highly dependent on member state domestic criminal justice and 
prosecutorial legal systems, which are profoundly different and diverse in 
                                                        
186 European Parliament (2014), Hearing Vĕra Jourová, Dat 3: 7 October, organized by the 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs (http://www.europarl. 
europa.eu/hearings-2014/en/schedule/01-10-2014/vera-jourova/). 
187 The European Parliament and the Council (2017) Directive 2017/1731 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial 
interests by means of criminal law, OJ L198/29, 28.7.2107 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017L1371&from=EN). 
188Until present the following countries do not take part in the EPPO: Denmark, Ireland, the 
United Kingdom, Sweden, Poland and Hungary. 
189Fabio Giuffrida (2017), “The European Public Prosecutor’s Office: King without kingdom?”, 
CEPS, Brussels, 14 February. 
190 Commission Communication - A Europe that protects: an initiative to extend the 
competences of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to cross-border terrorist crimes. 
191 The EPPO will be composed by a ‘Central Office’ comprising the College, Permanent 
Chambers, the European Chief Prosecutor (and deputies) and European Prosecutors. This will 
come alongside a decentralised component comprising ‘European Delegated Prosecutors’ in 
each of the participating member states and who will have a ‘double hat’, being at the same 
time national prosecutors and representing the EPPO in their respective countries. 
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nature, and where the independence of prosecutorial authorities also varies 
depending on each EU member state.  
Other outstanding issues include the lack of independent judicial 
oversight at Union level.192 The Luxembourg Court has only very limited 
competences to supervise its activities, so judicial oversight is carried out mainly 
at national levels. Other related questions concern accountability and remedies 
in cases where its activities may lead to fundamental rights violations, in 
particular those of suspected and accused persons in criminal proceedings. 
3.5.2 Europol 
Following various acts of terrorism in several European capitals and cities, and 
especially since the Paris attacks of January and November 2015, the internal 
structure of the EU law enforcement agency, Europol, was expanded and a new 
mandate adopted (See also Section 3.4.4. above). Europol set up a new European 
Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC). The European Agenda on Security 
underlined the importance of the Union’s support in fighting terrorism and 
facilitating coordination among domestic law enforcement authorities and 
called for the setting up of the ECTC.193 This was followed by the Justice and 
Home Affairs Council adopting Conclusions on Counter-Terrorism on 20 
November 2015,194 which see it playing a role in ensuring “information sharing 
and operational coordination with regard to the monitoring and investigation of 
foreign terrorist fighters, the trafficking of illegal firearms and terrorist 
financing”.  
The ECTC was officially established on January 2016 with the ambition to 
become a “central information hub” and increase member state support.195 It 
                                                        
192 Mitsilegas and Giuffrida, op.cit. 
193 European Agenda on Security, page 13.  
194 Refer to www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/foreign-fighters/ and 
see also the Conclusions of the Council of the EU and of the Member States meeting within the 
Council on Counter-Terrorism, Press Release, 848/15, 20.11.2015 (www.consilium.europa.eu/press-
releases-pdf/2015/11/40802205351_en_ 635836435200000000.pdf). 
195 See https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/european-counter-terrorism-centre-
ectc#fndtn-tabs-0-bottom-1 Europol’s ECTC has mainly focused on tackling foreign fighters, 
sharing intelligence and expertise on terrorism financing (TFTP and support by the FIU.net), 
online terrorist propaganda and extremism (Internet Referral Unit), illegal arms trafficking 
and international cooperation to increase effectiveness and prevention. ECTC started with 39 
staff members and 5 seconded national experts. The Second Progress report towards an 
effective and genuine Security Union underlined that “The Commission has delivered on its 
commitment to reinforce Europol by proposing a further additional 20 staff for the European 
Counter-Terrorism Centre to increase its capacity to respond on 24/7 basis to Member States 
in the case of a major terrorist attack. This proposed reinforcement is in addition to the 35 staff 
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came alongside the subsequent adoption of a renewed mandate for Europol.196 
Thanks to this new Regulation, Europol now has an enhanced degree of 
democratic control and monitoring of compliance with its mission and the 
impacts of its activities on fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, 
as well as more concrete procedural rules on access to confidential Europol 
documents and sensitive non-classified and classified information processed by 
or through Europol.197 The new Regulation foresaw the setting up of a new Joint 
Parliamentary Scrutiny Group (JPSG) composed of representatives of national 
parliaments and the LIBE Committee in the European Parliament.198 It also 
foresees the possibility to nominate a JPSG member to participate as ‘non-voting 
observer’ on Europol’s management board. 
The revised mandate also streamlined Europol’s data protection rules 
with those laid down in EU data protection instruments applicable in police 
cooperation (see Section 3.6.1 below), and new provisions on communication of 
data breaches and rights on access, rectification and erasure of information by 
data subjects.199 It provides for an enhanced monitoring role by the European 
Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), a very welcome step forward in ensuring 
the protection of fundamental rights regarding personal data processing at 
Europol, including hearing and investigating individuals’ complaints.200 Of 
concern there remains the lack of robust safeguards in cases of exchanges of 
personal data directly from private parties, as well as its subsequent transfer by 
Europol, as envisaged in Art. 26. Moreover, the rules covering the accuracy of 
information are equally weak and do not allow for preventing the use of 
unlawfully gathered data (following the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine), which 
                                                        
granted following the EU amending budget 1/2016 adopted by the budgetary authority on 
13 April 2016”, page 4. European Commission (2016), Communication, Second Progress 
report towards an effective and genuine Security Union, Brussels, 16.11.2016 COM(2016) 732 
final (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016DC0732 
&from=EN). 
196 Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 
on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing 
and repealing Council Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 
2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA, Article 61. 
197 Art. 52 of new Europol Regulation. 
198 Refer to Art. 51 of the new Europol Regulation. 
199 Recital 40 of Preamble and Chapter VI of the Regulation. See also the role played by the 
independent Data Protection Officer (Art. 41). 
200 Art. 43.  
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may be used in criminal investigations,201 or any clear sanctions for member 
state authorities responsible for that information. 
The new mandate also expanded Europol’s tasks in Joint Investigation 
Teams (JITs).202 Previous CEPS research203 called for ensuring more clarity 
regarding the new role attributed to Europol in its new Regulation on the 
financing (awarding of grants) of JITs, so that any new joint investigation 
initiatives would fully meet EU legal standards covering prosecutorial 
investigations, and where Eurojust would play a central role in initiating and 
coordinating JITs, while making sure that they fully comply with EU evidence 
gathering legal standards in cross-border judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters. Also its exact relationship and value added in relation to the EU 
Counter-Terrorism Coordinator204 in the area of information sharing remains 
unclear and calls for justification based on robust evidence. 
3.5.3 E-evidence, data retention and terrorist content online 
Access to electronic information held and processed by IT companies for law 
enforcement purposes has represented a central priority for this Commission. 
The issue can be seen as a ‘US-import’, with the increasing number of 
transatlantic demands of direct (non-mediated) access to electronic data by US 
authorities, which as the case of Microsoft shows, ended up before the relevant 
judicial instances and remain by and large unresolved.205 
During his intervention before the LIBE Committee of the European 
Parliament on 30 September 2014 as Commissioner-designate, Avramopoulos 
underlined as one of his key priorities the need for the EU to find “a new 
narrative on the role of law enforcement in the digital age. The availability of 
electronic communications data is a critical tool for criminal investigations. EU 
action on law enforcement in the digital age has to provide the necessary tools 
                                                        
201 See Art. 29. 
202 Art. 5. 
203 Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild and Valsamis Mitsilegas (2017), Reflections on the Terrorist 
Attacks in Barcelona Constructing a principled and trust-based EU approach to countering 
terrorism, CEPS Policy Insight, Brussels (https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/PI2017-
32%20JHA%20Terrorism%20and%20Barcelona.pdf). 
204 Refer to https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/ 
counter-terrorism-coordinator/  
205 Sergio Carrera, Gloria González Fuster, Elspeth Guild, Valsamis Mitsilegas (2015) Access to 
Electronic Data by Third-Country Law Enforcement Authorities: Challenges to EU Rule of Law and 
Fundamental Rights, CEPS, Brussels (https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Access 
%20to%20Electronic%20Data%20%2B%20covers_0.pdf). 
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to fight terrorism and serious crime, including cybercrime, while fully 
respecting the right to privacy and the protection of personal data.”206 
Later on, this ‘security’ or law enforcement priority moved to the ‘criminal 
justice’ portfolio under the responsibility of Commissioner Jourová and DG 
JUST. This move – from ‘police cooperation’ to ‘judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters’ – has however proved to be one of the key weaknesses characterising 
the Commission’s proposals on e-evidence. In fact, the above-mentioned 
Commission’s European Security Agenda of April 2015 was the one formally 
calling for reviewing obstacles in judicial investigations and rules on access to 
electronic information, which once more shows how a security rationale has 
often overtaken a traditional judicial cooperation in criminal matters approach, 
and led to a worrying blurring between security and justice in the work of the 
Juncker Commission.207  
In April 2018,208 after lengthy background preparations209 and internal 
legal fine-tuning, the Commission presented two separate legislative proposals: 
one regulation creating the European Production Order210 and a European 
Preservation Order; and one directive harmonising the appointment of legal 
representatives211 in companies concerned for the purpose of gathering evidence 
in criminal proceedings.  
                                                        
206 Hearing Dimitris Avramopoulos (2014), op.cit. 
207European Commission (2015a), Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions The European Agenda on Security, COM(2015) 185 final, Strasbourg, 28 April. 
(https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/basic-
documents/docs/eu_agenda_on_security_en.pdf) See specifically pages 19 and 20 of this 
Communication. 
208 European Commission (2018), “Security Union: Commission facilitates access to electronic 
evidence”, European Commission Press Release, Brussels, 17 April. (http://europa.eu/ 
rapid/press-release_IP-18-3343_en.htm) 
209 European Commission, “Improving cross-border access to electronic evidence in criminal 
matters” (https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/ares-2017-
3896097_en). 
210 European Commission (2018), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in 
criminal matters {SWD(2018) 118 final} - {SWD(2018) 119 final}, COM/2018/225 final - 
2018/0108 (COD), Strasbourg, 17 April (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource 
.html?uri=cellar:639c80c9-4322-11e8-a9f4-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF). 
211 European Commission (2018), Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council laying down harmonised rules on the appointment of legal representatives for 
the purpose of gathering evidence in criminal proceedings {SWD(2018) 118 final} - 
{SWD(2018) 119 final}, COM(2018) 226 final - 2018/0107 (COD), Strasbourg, 17 April 
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The European Production and Preservation Order would allow law 
enforcement authorities in the EU (police and prosecutors) a direct access to 
electronic information (including emails) held by service providers offering 
services in the Union and established or represented in another member state. 
The service providers would be under the general obligation to allow access to 
requested data within 10 days, and 6 hours in cases of ‘emergency’. They would 
be also obliged to ‘preserve’ this data for the duration of the investigations.  
A key challenge characterising these proposals is that they evade the 
current model of mediated mutual legal assistance, whereby an independent 
judicial authority and relevant Ministries of Justice play a key role in scrutinising 
the validity, constitutionality and fundamental rights compliance of data 
requests for law enforcement purposes. This has certainly been the case in the 
context of third-country cooperation under the so-called Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaties (MLATs) with countries such as the US.212  
When it comes to intra-EU mutual legal assistance, and despite the 
Commission proposals coming with a detailed Impact Assessment, there has 
been no solid evidence regarding the actual value added of the EPO in 
comparison to the already existing system under the European Investigation 
Order (EIO). The EIO only entered into force in May 2017, and some EU member 
states are still in the process of correctly implementing it in their national 
criminal justice systems. As opposed to the EPO, the EIO does offer high-
standards and guarantees – fully compliant with the rights of the defence and 
fair trial envisaged in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – for independent 
judicial oversight in data request for the purposes of criminal investigations as 
well as expedited procedures in urgent cases.  
The legal basis of the proposal is equally contested. Previous CEPS 
research has underlined that the EPO is closer to police cooperation or internal 
security, rather than an instrument falling within the scope of judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters.213 By side-lining the role of national judicial 
authorities in the executing state, the EPO evades the principle of mutual 
recognition of criminal justice decisions and primarily serves law enforcement 
                                                        
(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018PC0226&from=EN). 
212 European Union and the United States of America (2003), Mutual Legal Assistance: 
Agreement Between the United States of America and the European Union, Signed at 
Washington 25 June 2003 (https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/180815.pdf). 
213 Sergio Carrera and Valsamis Mitsilegas (2017), “Constitutionalising the Security Union: 
Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Rights on Countering Terrorism and Crime”, CEPS, Brussels, 
21 November (https://www.ceps.eu/publications/constitutionalising-security-union-
effectiveness-rule-law-and-rights-countering). 
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in the pursuit of crimes. The correct legal basis should therefore not be Art. 
82(1)(d) TFEU (judicial cooperation in criminal matters), but rather Art. 87(2) 
TFEU (police cooperation). This is also the opinion of civil society, which has 
called on the EU legislator to choose a more convincing legal basis and 
underlined that “the principle of mutual recognition has been reserved for 
cooperation between judicial authorities only”.214 
The proposal also positions the private sector in a central role in delivering 
and monitoring mutual trust in the European criminal justice area, and 
determining if data requests comply with the fundamental rights of suspects, 
without relieving IT service providers from potential liabilities before the courts 
in cases of unlawful access. Its relationship with the still unresolved ‘data 
retention saga’,215 and the ongoing negotiations of the so-called ‘e-Privacy 
Directive’,216 are not clear either. This raises further privacy concerns217 as to 
whether the proposal will be court-proof not only in Luxembourg but also 
before domestic constitutional tribunals. 
Despite these concerns, the Council reached a draft general approach on 
the proposal on 30 November 2018.218 However, representatives from eight 
Ministries of Justice of EU member states (Germany, The Netherlands, Czech 
Republic, Finland, Latvia, Sweden, Hungary and Greece) expressed written 
concerns about the proposal on 20 November 2018.219 They stated that the 
proposals would mean that “mutual recognition would be largely abandoned” 
                                                        
214 Meijers Committee, CM1809 Comments on the proposal for a regulation on European 
Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters 
(https://www.commissie-meijers.nl/sites/all/files/cm1809_e-evidence_note.pdf) 
215 Elspeth Guild and Sergio Carrera (2014), “The Political and Judicial Life of Metadata: 
Digital Rights Ireland and the Trail of the Data Retention Directive”, CEPS, Brussels, No. 65, 
May (https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/EG%20and%20SC%20Data%20retention.pdf). 
216 European Commission (2017), “Proposal for a Regulation on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications”, Digital Single Market, 10 January (https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/news/proposal-regulation-privacy-and-electronic-communications) 
217 Statewatch (2018), “"Renewable retention warrants": a new concept in the data retention 
debate”, State Watch, 25 April (http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/apr/eu-data-
retention-renewable.htm). 
218 Council of the European Union (2018), Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on European production and preservation orders for electronic evidence in criminal 
matters- general approach, Interinstitutional File: 2018/0108(COD), Brussels, 30 November 
(https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15020-2018-INIT/en/pdf). 
219 Ministries of Justice of Germany, The Netherlands, Czech Republic, Finland, Latvia, 
Sweden, Hungary, Greece (2018), Letter to Mrs Vĕra Jourová, 20 November 
(https://cdn.netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2018/11/2018-11-20_Justizminister-Brief_E-
Evidence1.pdf). 
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and a source of “great concern”. The letter called on the Commission to ensure 
a more robust system of checks and balances, which would make it 
‘Luxembourg Court-proof’, and the need to guarantee a mediated model of 
cooperation keeping the current role of the requested or notified authority/state 
to reject or withdraw a European Production Order, as well as effective judicial 
remedies.  
18 civil society actors have recently expressed deep concerns about the 
compromise agreement reached among EU member states during the Austrian 
Presidency.220 In short, they have highlighted as problematic that the proposal 
reduces the chances for refusing access to data on the basis of fundamental rights 
violations, wrongly assumes that non-content data is less sensitive than ‘content 
data’, allows the issuing of orders without court validation and by-passes the 
role of executing authorities and mutual-trust based cooperation. Similar 
concerns have been put forward by the European Data Protection Board 
(EDPB)221, the German Association of Judges,222 Internet industry,223 Bar 
Associations,224 etc. 
Tackling illegal content online, particularly ‘terrorist content’, has also 
been a priority of the Juncker Commission. On 12 September 2018, the 
Commission presented a Proposal for a Regulation on preventing the 
dissemination of terrorist content online,225 and complementing Directive 
                                                        
220 European Digital Rights (EDRi) (2018), “Civil society urges Member States to seriously 
reconsider its draft position on law enforcement access to data or “e-evidence””, 5 December 
2018 (https://edri.org/files/20181203_e-evidence_civilsocietyletter.pdf). 
221 European Data Protection Board (2018), “Opinion 23/2018 on Commission proposals on 
European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters”, 8 
October (https://edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/our-documents/opinion-art-70/opinion-
232018-commission-proposals-european-production_en). 
222 Deutcher Richterbund (2018), “Stellungnahme des Deutschen Richterbundes zur 
Europäischen Verordnung zu elektronischen Beweismitteln in Strafsachen”, 4 July 
(https://www.drb.de/positionen/stellungnahmen/stellungnahme/news/618/). 
223 EurolSPA (2018), “E-Evidence: EuroISPA adopts Position Paper”, Brussels, 3 July 
(http://www.euroispa.org/e-evidence-euroispa-adopts-position-paper/). 
224 Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (2018), “CCBE position on the Commission 
proposal for a Regulation on European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic 




225 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on preventing the dissemination of 
terrorist content online A contribution from the European Commission to the Leaders’ 
meeting in Salzburg on 19-20 September 2018, Brussels, 12.9.2018 COM(2018) 640 final 
2018/0331 (COD). 
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2017/514 on combating terrorism.226 The role and specific duties of hosting 
service/content providers and internet platforms to remove unlawful content or 
disable accessibility is another key issue at stake here. In short, the legislative 
initiative provides a harmonised definition of terrorist content, and a legal 
obligation for relevant IT companies to comply with ‘removal orders’ issued by 
member state competent authorities requesting deletion or preventing access to 
them under an accelerated time-line, and the preservation of that data. 
Similar to the above-mentioned EPO proposal, key issues of concern are 
first, the need to ensure independent judicial review of content removal, and 
second, the central role entrusted to IT companies in an area at the heart of states’ 
sovereignty and their citizens’ protection. The UN Special Rapporteur on 
freedom of expression made clear in April 2018 that online content removals 
must be subject to “an order by an independent and impartial judicial authority, 
and in accordance with due process and standards of legality, necessity and 
legitimacy”.227 
These and other issues with the Commission’s proposal have been 
underlined and reiterated by a Joint Letter issued on 7 December 2018 by three 
United Nations Special Rapporteurs.228 The Joint Letter raises profound 
questions regarding the very broad definition of terrorist content (which would 
include legitimate forms of expression) and the lack of sufficient consideration 
given to human rights protections, especially freedom of opinion, expression 
and association, and of the human rights responsibilities of businesses according 
to existing UN standards.229  
The same UN Special Rapporteurs emphasised that the legislative 
proposal lacks sufficient clarity and fails to pass the legality test in light of 
international human rights obligations. These deficits, they contend, “become 
particularly problematic when such hosting service providers play a role in 
                                                        
226 Directive (EU) 2017/541 on combatting terrorism and replacing Council Framework 
Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Decision 2005/671/JHA, 15 March 2017. 
227 United Nations, Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, 6 April 2018, 
paragraph 66 (https://undocs.org/A/HRC/38/35). 
228 United Nations, Joint Letter, Mandates of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression; the Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Privacy and the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, OL OTH 71/2018, Geneva.  
229 Refer to United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, 
Respect and Remedy” Framework (https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/ 
GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf). 
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areas traditionally ascribed to States, such as by exercising quasi-regulative, 
quasi-enforcement and quasi-adjudicative functions in the context of the fight 
against terrorism”.230 These risks were corroborated in a Statement issued by 31 
civil society organisations, which called for a significant amendment of the 
proposal due to the serious risks of arbitrariness and negative impacts for civil 
society organisations, investigative journalism and academic research.231 
3.5.4 EU-US Privacy Shield  
Following the invalidation by the CJEU of the Safe Harbour decision232 in 
October 2015,233 which concluded that it did not allow for an adequate level of 
data protection equivalent to the one guaranteed in the EU legal system (see 
Section 3.6 below), the European Commission adopted an Implementing 
Decision (EU) 2016/1250 on the EU-US Privacy Shield to regulate transatlantic 
transfers of personal data between commercial organisations.234 The Privacy 
Shield brought important improvements in comparison to the former Safe 
Harbour system, such as a clearer set of standards235 and the previous US 
administration commitments and assurances. 
Unresolved concerns have been raised by the European Parliament about 
the lack of an ‘adequate level of protection’ for personal data in relation to its 
“commercial aspects”, as well as unwarranted access by US public authorities 
on data transferred from the EU – in particular for purposes of national security 
                                                        
230 Ibid., page 7. 
231 EDRI, Letter on the Proposal for Regulation preventing the dissemination of terrorism 
content online, Brussels, 18 December 2018, Brussels (https://edri.org/files/ 
counterterrorism/20181204-CivilSociety_letter_TERREG.pdf). 
232 Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild (2015), “Safe Harbour or into the storm? EU-US data 
transfers after the Schrems judgment”, CEPS, Brussels, 12 November (https://www.ceps.eu/ 
publications/safe-harbour-or-storm-eu-us-data-transfers-after-schrems-judgment). 
233 Case C362/14 Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner. 
234Elspeth Guild, Didier Bigo, Sergio Carrera (2017), “Trump’s Travel Bans: Harvesting 
personal data and requiem for the EU-US Privacy Shield”, CEPS, Brussels, 5 April 
(https://www.ceps.eu/publications/trump%E2%80%99s-travel-bans-harvesting-personal-
data-and-requiem-eu-us-privacy-shield). 
235 In short these include in view of the European Parliament “the insertion of key definitions, 
stricter obligations related to data retention and onward transfers to third countries, the 
creation of an Ombudsperson to ensure individual redress and independent oversight, checks 
and balances ensuring the rights of data subjects (PCLOB), external and internal compliance 
reviews, more regular and rigorous documentation and monitoring, the availability of several 
ways to pursue legal remedy, prominent role for national DPAs in the investigation of 
claims”, paragraph 2 of European Parliament resolution on the adequacy of the protection 
afforded by the EUU.S. Privacy Shield 2018/2645(RSP), 11.6.2018. 
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and law enforcement, with US large-scale surveillance programmes still 
ongoing, as well as the persistent weakness of fundamental rights protections of 
data subjects (to prevent cases of automated profiling and processing, and the 
non-consent based processing of data and inexistence of a right to object to data 
transfers) and the lack of effective remedies available to EU citizens when their 
data is transferred to the US.236  
The Article 29 Working Party,237 which corresponds now with the EDPB, 
also highlighted the lack of specific rules and “the need of stricter guarantees on 
the independence and powers of the Ombudsperson mechanism, or the lack of 
concrete assurances of not conducting mass and indiscriminate collection of 
personal data (bulk collection)”. The above-mentioned Parliament Resolution on 
the Privacy Shield recalled that ‘privacy’ cannot be balanced against 
“commercial or political interests” and concluded that as it currently stands, it 
does not provide an adequate level of protection in line with EU law.  
The Parliament called the Commission to suspend the Privacy Shield until 
the US authorities comply with its terms. The Commission has not, as yet, 
followed up this urgent call for action. This stands in contradiction with Vice-
President Timmermans’ promise in his appointment hearing before the LIBE 
Committee of the European Parliament that “it is also of crucial importance that 
in our dealings with third countries, fundamental rights, including personal 
data protection, must be fully respected.”238 Similarly, Commissioner Jourová 
undertook at the same moment before Parliament to conclude an agreement 
with the US so long as EU citizens’ right to an effective remedy were duly 
safeguarded, which is currently not the case.239 There is a high risk that the EU-
US Privacy Shield will not be CJEU-proof and would not easily pass judicial 
scrutiny in light of EU data protection standards.240  
This coincided with the revelations on misuses of personal data by IT and 
social media companies such as Facebook, which is signatory to the EU-US 
                                                        
236 Resolution of 6 April 2017, the European Parliament. 
237 Article 29 Working Party, Press Release, First annual Joint Review of the Privacy Shield, 
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=610170. Refer to Article 
29 Working Party Opinions WP237 and WP238. 
238 European Parliament (2014), “Hearing Frans Timmermans”, Day 6: 7 October, organized 
by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs (http://www.europarl. 
europa.eu/hearings-2014/en/schedule/07-10-2014/frans-timmermans/). 
239 Hearing Vĕra Jourová (2014), op.cit. 
240 There is one pending case before the Luxembourg Court of central relevance for the Privacy 
Shield, i.e. an action for annulment by La Quadrature du Net and Others v Commission (Case T-
738/16) of October 2016. Refer also to the CJEU ruling in Case Facebook Ireland Limited and 
Maximilian Schrems (Schrems II case) Case C-498/16, 25 January 2018. 
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Privacy Shield. Evidence showed that the data of about 2.7 million EU citizens 
was improperly used by political consultancy Cambridge Analytica.241 
According to the European Parliament, “the revelations clearly show that the 
Privacy Shield mechanism does not provide an adequate protection of the right 
to data protection”,242 and expressed “its strong concern that, if not dealt with, 
such misuses of personal data of people by various entities that aim to 
manipulate their political will or voting behaviour, can threaten the democratic 
process and its underlying idea that voters can make informed, fact-based 
decisions for themselves”. The Parliament called for greater algorithmic 
accountability and transparency and regretted that the deadline of 1 September 
2018 for the US to be fully compliant with the Privacy Shield has not been met.243 
On this basis, it reiterated its calls to the Commission to suspend the Privacy 
Shield until the US complies with its terms.   
3.5.5 Interoperability, information systems and eu-LISA  
The exchange of information between national law enforcement authorities has 
been a long-standing priority in EU counter-terrorism policies. This Commission 
has taken this priority to a new level. In the above-mentioned European Security 
Agenda, the Commission highlighted ‘better information exchange’ as one of 
the key pillars in EU cooperation in addressing crime and terrorism.244  
Over the last two decades of European integration the EU has developed 
a range of databases. These include the Schengen Information System (SIS II) 
and the Visa Information System (VIS) – which as Annex I of this book shows 
have been also recently reformed, as well as Eurodac (the European Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System), the Europol Information System or the 
recently adopted European Travel Information and Authorisation System 
(ETIAS), which did not come with an impact assessment considering its 
necessity and fundamental rights impacts.245. The Commission, and more 
                                                        
241 See for instance The Guardian (2018), Cambridge Analytica Scandal: The Biggest 
Revelations so Far, 22 March 2018 (https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/ 
22/cambridge-analytica-scandal-the-biggest-revelations-so-far); and The Guardian’s Section 
‘The Cambridge Analytica Files’ (https://www.theguardian.com/news/series/cambridge-
analytica-files). 
242 Paragraph 12 of European Parliament resolution on the adequacy of the protection 
afforded by the EUU.S. Privacy Shield 2018/2645(RSP), 11.6.2018. 
243 Paragraph 29 of European Parliament Motion of Resolution no the use of Facebook users’ 
data by Cambridge Analytica and the impact on data protection, 201/82855(RSP), 10.10.2018. 
244 European Commission (2015a), op.cit. 
245 European Commission (2018), “Security Union: Commission welcomes the European 
Parliament's adoption of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) 
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specifically, the Commissioner for Security Union, have placed particular 
emphasis on overcoming the ‘fragmentation’246 that these systems appear to 
create through the ‘interoperability’247 of existing and future EU databases.  
Another important output from the Task Force on Security Union led by 
Commissioner King was a so-called Comprehensive Assessment of EU Security 
Policy published on July 2017,248 which sought to review EU internal security 
policy during the last 15 years of European integration. The assessment was a 
welcome step but did not follow the EU Better Regulation guidelines. Its 
findings highlighted a number of key “shortcomings” affecting EU information 
systems: “(a) sub-optimal functionalities of existing information systems, (b) 
gaps in the EU’s architecture of data management, (c) a complex landscape of 
differently governed information systems, and (d) a fragmented architecture of 
data management for border control and security”. On the basis of a report 
issued by the High-Level Expert Group on Information Systems and 
Interoperability set up by the Commission in May 2017,249 the Comprehensive 
Assessment then reconfirmed the need to develop their interoperability.  
In December 2017, the Commission adopted two proposals for regulation 
establishing a framework for interoperability between EU information systems, 
one dealing with those covering police and judicial cooperation, migration and 
                                                        
and a stronger eu-LISA Agency”, Press Release, Strasbourg, 5 July (http://europa.eu/ 
rapid/press-release_IP-18-4367_en.htm). Susie Alegre, Julien Jeandesboz and Niovi Vavoula 
(2017), European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS): Border 
management, fundamental rights and data protection, European Parliament, DG IPOL.  
246 European Commission (2016), Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the European Council and the Council delivering on the European Agenda on 
Security to fight against terrorism and pave the way towards an effective and genuine 




247 European Commission (2017), “Frequently asked questions - Interoperability of EU 
information systems for security, border and migration management”, European 
Commission Press Release, Strasbourg, 12 December (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-17-5241_en.htm). 
248 European Commission (2017), “Security: the EU is driving work to share information, 
combat terrorist financing and protect Europeans online”, European Commission Press 
Release, Brussels, 27 July (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-2106_en.htm). 
249 High-level expert group on information systems and interoperability (2017), Final Report, 
Ref. Ares(2017)2412067, 11 May (http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm? 
do=groupDetail.groupDetailDoc&id=32600&no=1). 
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asylum,250 and another on Schengen-related databases on visas and borders.251 
The interoperability proposals came alongside another one aimed at 
strengthening the mandate of the eu-LISA Agency,252 which was formally 
adopted on 14 November 2018. In addition to the above, a key objective behind 
the proposals is the detection of multiple identities and ‘combating identity 
fraud’, as well as “fast, seamless, systematic and controlled access” by law 
enforcement (police and judicial authorities). 
The notion of ‘interoperability’ would not only entail the creation of a 
single search interface allowing for one query across all existing EU information 
systems. It would also allow for the interconnectivity of the data registered and 
the establishment of a shared biometric matching system and the accessibility of 
this information. The proposals would create three additional EU databases: a 
Common Identity Repository (CIR); a shared biometric matching system 
(sBMS); and a Multiple Identity Detector (MID) – which would lead to the 
creation of a new EU electronic identity for crime-fighting.  
The rule of law and fundamental rights challenges inherent to 
interoperability have been highlighted by CEPS research.253 The proposals have 
not fully taken into account their data protection and privacy implications. In 
                                                        
250 European Commission (2017), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on establishing a framework for interoperability between EU information 
systems (police and judicial cooperation, asylum and migration) {SWD(2017) 473 final} - 





251 European Commission (2017), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on establishing a framework for interoperability between EU information 
systems (borders and visa) and amending Council Decision 2004/512/EC, Regulation (EC) 
No 767/2008, Council Decision 2008/633/JHA, Regulation (EU) 2016/399 and Regulation 
(EU) 2017/2226 {SWD(2017) 473 final} - {SWD(2017) 474 final}, COM(2017) 793 final - 




252 European Commission (2017), “Security Union: Commission delivers on interoperability 
of EU information systems” European Commission Press Release, Brussels, 29 June 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1788_en.htm). 
253 Sergio Carrera and Valsamis Mitsilegas (2017), “Constitutionalising the Security Union: 
Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Rights on Countering Terrorism and Crime”, CEPS, Brussels, 
21 November (https://www.ceps.eu/publications/constitutionalising-security-union-
effectiveness-rule-law-and-rights-countering). 
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particular, the way in which they undermine the principle of ‘purpose 
limitation’ of data, as well as the implementation challenges they would entail 
on the ground in multi-actor domestic settings. They provided little evidence 
about how the ‘gaps’ resulting from the existence of compartmentalised EU 
information systems represent a security threat, and what these gaps actually 
are. 
The EDPS Opinion on the Interoperability Proposals254 underlined the 
privacy risks inherent to their design, chiefly in relation to the general trend of 
granting law enforcement authorities access to systems built for other purposes 
than law enforcement, such as for example the VIS or Eurodac. It also signalled 
its incompatibility with the principle of purpose limitation and the negative 
repercussions on the rights of third-country data subjects, in particular the right 
of access, rectification and deletion of inaccurate data and information and an 
effective remedy before an independent judicial authority (Art. 47 EUCFR). 
The EDPS underlined discrimination concerns and emphasised that 
“Taking systematically biometric data of a person during an identity check 
would create the risk of stigmatising certain people (or groups of people) based 
on their appearance and create unjustified difference of treatment between EU 
citizens and third-country nationals.” The Article 29 Working Party raised 
similar concerns as to whether such a new biometric register of third-country 
nationals is proportionate and whether it constitutes an unjustifiable 
discrimination of third country nationals.  
These risks are particularly worrying, not least when considering the 
findings of a Report issued by the FRA in 2018 that provided evidence on the 
lack of quality of the biometric data in existing EU databases and how their 
interoperability would further increase or multiple the risks of misuses, abuses 
and errors when base-line quality is low.255 According to the FRA “Individuals 
often lack awareness and understanding of what needs to be done in case of 
mistakes in their personal data processed by the systems”. Interoperability 
would extend that gap even further.  
For this reason, the FRA recommended the establishment of an ‘EU-wide 
request handling mechanism’ at the eu-LISA agency to manage requests to 
access, correct and delete data as well as to provide data subjects with the 
                                                        
254European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) (2018), Opinion 4/2018 on the Proposals for 
two Regulations establishing a framework for interoperability between EU large-scale 
information systems, 16 April (https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/2018-
04-16_interoperability_opinion_en.pdf). 
255 FRA (2018), Under watchful eyes – biometrics, EU IT-systems and fundamental rights, 
March (https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2018/biometrics-rights-protection). 
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information they need.256 This constitutes a major lacuna in the recently adopted 
eu-LISA Regulation 2018/1726.257 Despite the fact that its activities are often 
dressed up as only ‘operational management’ or ‘technical solutions’, its new 
mandate includes far-reaching operational, research and policy tasks such as 
personal data processing, ensuring ‘data quality’ (which will be most 
challenging in light of the ‘interoperability’ proposals), developing other large-
scale IT systems, implementing research projects and testing pilot projects,258 as 
well as providing ad hoc operational support to member state facing 
“extraordinary security and migration challenges” in particular areas of their 
external borders (e.g. hotspots).259 The Regulation does not envisage any 
complaint procedure or mechanism before any EU agencies such as the EDPS or 
the European Ombudsman for individuals affected by fundamental rights 
violations in the context of any of these new responsibilities. 
It is also concerning in light of the newly explicit role given to 
‘outsourcing’ eu-LISA tasks to external private-sector actors and network 
providers,260 some of which may entail higher fundamental rights risks in light 
of the challenges inherent to data processing frameworks such as the one 
envisaged in the EU-US Privacy Shield (Section 3.5.3 above). The Regulation 
envisages a weak role for the European Parliament in delivering full democratic 
scrutiny of all the agency’s activities, which stands in sharp contrast with the 
JPSG model foreseen in the revised Europol mandate (Section 3.5.1 of this book). 
3.6 Rule of law and fundamental rights  
3.6.1 Fundamental rights 
The Juncker Commission has made some progress in the development of 
common EU fundamental rights standards. A key and highly visible 
achievement of this Commission was the formal adoption and entry into force 
of the new EU data protection framework, including the General Data Protection 
                                                        
256 FRA (2018), Interoperability and fundamental rights implications Opinion of the European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, FRA Opinion – 1/2018, Vienna, 11 April 2018 
(https://fra.europa.eu/en/opinion/2018/interoperability). 
257 Regulation (EU) 2018/1726 on the European Union Agency for the Operational 
Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-
LISA), OJ L 295/99, 21.11.2018. 
258 See Arts. 12 -15. 
259 Art. 16 (Support to Member States and the Commission). 
260 Art. 11 of the Regulation (Tasks relating to the Communications infrastructure). 
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Directive (GDPR)261 and the Police Data Protection Directive.262 The swift 
conclusions of the inter-institutional negotiations on common EU data 
protection rules was signalled as another key priority by Commissioner Jourová 
in her Commissioner-designate hearing before the European Parliament in 
October 2014.263 The GDPR is now a key world-wide benchmark of transnational 
cooperation on privacy protection.  
A tough nut to crack during this legislature has been advancing in 
negotiations on the EU’s accession to the European Convention of Human 
Rights as stipulated in Art. 6.2 TUE and Protocol No. 8. These negotiations 
started in 2010 and led to the elaboration of a draft accession agreement in April 
2013. In his hearing as Commissioner-designate before the LIBE Committee of 
the European Parliament, Vice-President Timmermans underlined that “In the 
area of fundamental rights, my priority will be to complete the accession of the 
EU to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)”.  
A key unresolved controversy regarding the Union’s accession has been 
the extent to which the envisaged accession arrangement would affect the 
Union’s competences and the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU. In its 2/13 
Opinion issued on 18 December 2014,264 the Luxembourg Court issued a 
negative view on the Union’s accession as it argued that, among other issues,265 
it would affect the specific characteristics and autonomy of the EU legal system 
and did not include a clear co-respondent mechanism and procedure for prior 
involvement of the CJEU. As a result, a number of fundamental points of the 
‘draft Accession Agreement’ needed to be renegotiated.  
                                                        
261European Commission, “2018 reform of EU data protection rules” (https://ec.europa.eu/ 
commission/priorities/justice-and-fundamental-rights/data-protection/2018-reform-eu-
data-protection-rules_en). 
262 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation)1, and to Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal 
data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or 
prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. 
263 Hearing Vĕra Jourová (2014), op.cit. 
264Court of Justice of the European Union (2014), Opinion of the Court - Case Opinion 2/13, 
18 December 2014 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62013 
CV0002). 
265Adam Łazowski and Ramses Wessel (2015), “The European Court of Justice blocks the EU’s 
accession to the ECHR”, CEPs, Brussels, 8 January (https://www.ceps.eu/ 
publications/european-court-justice-blocks-eu%E2%80%99s-accession-echr). 
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Since then, the Commission continued to consult the relevant Council 
Working party on solutions to address the Courts’ objections.266 In its Annual 
Report on the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights published 
in June 2018,267 the Commission loosely underlined that it is “making good 
progress”. In the 12 October 2018 Council conclusions on the application of the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2017 the Council restated its call for the 
EU accede the ECHR and asked the Commission to swiftly complete its analysis 
of legal issues raised by the Luxembourg Court.268 
The same Annual Report on the Application of the EU Charter highlighted 
the main Commission work in the implementation of the Union’s non-
discrimination agenda. A key unaccomplished promise during this legislature 
has been the non-adoption of the 2008 proposal for a horizontal non-
discrimination Directive,269 which aimed at extending protection from 
discrimination beyond employment and occupation. If adopted, it would also 
cover discrimination on the basis of religion or belief, disability, age and sexual 
orientation to areas outside employment (social protection, education and access 
to goods and services, including housing). The discussions of the proposal inside 
the Council have not led to any progress.270 Some member states have 
questioned the value added of the proposal and raised concerns about its 
                                                        
266 European Commission (2017), Commission Staff Working Document on the Application 
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2016 Accompanying the document 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parlament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on 2016 Report on the 
Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights SWD/2017/0162 final, Brussels, 18 
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267 European Commission (2018), “2017 report on the application of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights”, Justice and Consumers (https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/ 
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269 Commission of the European Communities (2008), Proposal for a Council Directive on 
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270 W. van Ballegooij and J. Moxom (2018), “Equality and the Fight against Racism and 
Xenophobia Cost of Non-Europe Report”, European Parliamentary Research Service, 
European Added Value Unit, March (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ 
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compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, as well as 
budgetary implications and costs.271 
This is despite the fact that in President Juncker’s Political Guidelines and 
Commissioner Jorouvá’s promise before the European Parliament, both 
underlined the priority to see it adopted and make ‘renewed efforts’ to enable 
the Council to reach an agreement.272 In 2015 the European Parliament reiterated 
its call for the Council to adopt its position on the proposal urgently, and called 
on the Commission to make concrete progress on the anti-discrimination 
agenda. 
Moreover, Commissioner Jourová declared in April 2016 that moving 
ahead in improving procedural safeguards related to pre-trial detention 
constituted one of the five key priorities.273 There has been no progress in this 
regard, despite the fact that a lack of robust procedural safeguards for pre-trial 
detention and addressing prison overcrowding and unsatisfactory conditions in 
a number of EU member states can fundamentally hinder and pose major costs 
for effective EU judicial cooperation in criminal matters.274 
3.6.2 Rule of law  
In the answers provided in the hearing before the LIBE Committee of the 
European Parliament as Commission-designate in October 2014, Vice-President 
Timmermans identified as his first priority in relation to the rule of law “to seek 
to prevent a systemic threat to the rule of law from emerging in the first place. I 
strongly believe that prevention is better than cure”. He also insisted that “I will 
pay particular attention to the equal treatment of member states”. Timmermans 
also expressed his readiness to use of the EU Rule of Law Framework, and 
launch infringement proceedings, and declared that “Clearly, Article 7 TEU 
should be a last resort. I would hope that we never have a situation which 
requires its use. But if we do, I would be ready to make the necessary proposals”. 
                                                        
271 Refer to https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35974/st10202-en18.pdf  
272 Hearing Vĕra Jourová (2014), op.cit. 
273 European Commission, Press Release, EU Criminal Law – key to a Security Union based 
on fundamental rights and values (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-
1582_en.htm). 
274 Wouter van Ballegooij (2017), The Cost of non-European in the Area of Criminal Law, 
European Parliament Research Service (EPRS) (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/ 
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The lack of any other form of regular scrutiny of the rule of law post-
accession has been referred to as the Copenhagen Dilemma.275 Indeed, 
developments during recent years have shown how the trust-based 
presumption, according to which membership of the Union guarantees that 
states comply with Art. 2 TEU values, can no longer always be realistically 
maintained. Art. 7 TEU is the only Treaty instrument for European institutions 
to act in cases where a member state poses a “clear risk” of seriously breaching 
Art. 2 TEU values, or when such a breach already exists. Art. 7 TEU envisages a 
preventive arm (determining a clear risk of a breach) and a corrective arm 
(determining a serious and persistent breach). 
The previous Commission had adopted the so-called the ‘EU rule of law 
framework’ which provided a sort of ‘pre-Art. 7 TEU procedure’276 for the 
Commission to engage in diplomatic talks with any member state concerned. 
The EU rule of law framework was launched for the first time during the Juncker 
Commission against the Polish government. As previous CEPS research has 
argued, the case of Poland is nonetheless a clear example of the inefficiency 
affecting this EU tool.277  
The issuing of one rule of law opinion, four rule of law recommendations 
and twenty-five letters to the Polish authorities within the context of the EU rule 
of law framework have not prevented this country from progressively 
backsliding into a state of ‘constitutional capture’.278 Indeed, several Opinions of 
the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe indicated that threats to the 
rule of law in Poland have instead escalated over the past two years.279 This led 
the Commission to trigger, for the first time, the Art. 7 TEU procedure against 
the Polish government, and to launch infringement proceedings against some 
Polish government measures undermining the independence of the judiciary. 
Timmermans’ promise of ‘equal treatment’ has not been respected. The 
case of Hungary has been emblematic. The rule of law challenges in Hungary 
and Poland have been very similar, and in many aspects almost mimicking each 
                                                        
275 Viviane Reding (2013), “Safeguarding the rule of law and solving the "Copenhagen 
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other. The EU Rule of Law Framework was welcomed but equally criticised280 
at the outset in 2015 for treating member states differently and the Commission’s 
inaction in respect of Hungary was questioned in early 2016.281 Similarly, it is 
striking that the Commission has not launched Article 7 TEU proceedings 
against Hungary in light of all the existing evidence of the country actively 
backsliding on the rule of law and dismantling checks and balances since 2010.282 
It was the European Parliament that took the step of launching the Art. 7 
TEU procedure against the Hungarian government in September 2018,283 on the 
basis of a European Parliament Report.284 Published on 4 July 2018, the Report 
provided evidence raising serious rule of law concerns about Viktor Orbán’s 
government. CEPS research argued the European Parliament vote was a 
welcome development, but that it came too late and shows that the Art. 7 TEU 
procedure remains too political and weak in its current form.285 
Hungary is not the only EU country on the European Parliament’s rule of 
law radar. By way of illustration, in its Mission Report published in November 
2018 following the ad hoc delegation to Slovakia and Malta from 17-20 
September 2018,286 a cross-cutting finding concluded that “highlighted that 
challenges to rule of law and fundamental rights in various member states 
should be monitored regularly to be able to act more preventively. To achieve 
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that, the Commission and the Council could support setting up a permanent 
mechanism for monitoring democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights, 
along the lines proposed by the European Parliament in its resolution of 25 
October 2016”.287 
The European Commission Work Programme 2019288 identified “an area 
of justice and fundamental rights based on mutual trust” as one of the themes 
where new initiatives would be presented before the European Parliament 
elections in May 2019. It announced that the Commission intended to “present 
an initiative with a view to further strengthening the 2014 rule of law 
framework”.289 This proposal is pending at the time of writing. The call by the 
European Parliament for the Commission to put forward an initiative on “a 
comprehensive EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental 
rights (DRF)”, and the adoption of the inter-institutional agreement was 
reiterated in a Motion for Resolution of 7 November 2018. The Parliament 
warned the Commission that otherwise it “could take the initiative to launch a 
pilot DRF report and an inter-parliamentary debate”.290  
The Juncker Commission contributed towards a strengthened EU rule of 
law setting with a proposal for a Regulation that would make benefiting from 
EU funding (under the next EU Multiannual Financial Framework, MFF) 
conditional on rule of law compliance by all Member States.291 The initiative 
stated that “respect for fundamental values is an essential precondition for 
sound financial management and effective EU funding”. The Commission 
already has the power to use ‘rule of law budget conditionality’ and suspend 
European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIFs) in cases where a member 
state violates the rule of law. However, this new proposal would make this 
explicit and significantly expand the Commission’s competence to suspend or 
reduce EU funds292 in cases of “generalised deficiency as regards the rule of law” 
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290 European Parliament (2018), Motion for a Resolution, on the need for a comprehensive EU 
mechanism for the protection of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, B8-
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291 European Commission (2018), Regulation on the protection of the Union’s budget in case 
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292 Art. 4 of the Proposal for a Regulation.  
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affecting or presenting the risk of affecting EU financial interests or principles of 
sound financial management.293 It would introduce a qualified majority voting 
procedure within one month in the Council and only require the European 
Parliament to be informed. 
The Commission proposal has been found to be fully compatible with the 
EU Treaties and in harmony with other parallel EU rule of law legal and policy 
instruments.294 The European Court of Auditors (ECA) issued an Opinion on the 
budget conditionality proposal highlighting the lack of impact assessment and 
the wide discretionary powers that it leaves to the European Commission.295 
This is particularly so in respect of the inherent imprecision or legal uncertainty 
regarding the notion of “generalised deficiency as regards the rule of law” and 
the exact sources that the Commission would make use of when conducting a 
qualitative assessment concluding its existence as well as for the adoption or 
lifting of sanctions. 
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judicial review by independent courts, the prevention and sanctioning of fraud and 
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Anti-Fraud Office) and the EPPO in investigations and prosecutions.  
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND PRIORITIES  
o has the Juncker Commission meant a new start in EU JHA cooperation? 
This book has illustrated that there have been several important policy, 
legal and institutional developments advancing or taking forward 
‘Europeanisation’ of the Union’s AFSJ. The period between 2014 and 2018 has 
meant a further liberalisation of the Community method of cooperation and full 
operationalisation of the enforcement powers of the European Commission and 
judicial scrutiny by the CJEU. This has been particularly so in relation to EU 
policies related to judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police.  
The European Commission’s response to the 2015 refugee humanitarian 
crisis was prompt and the adoption of the temporary relocation mechanism 
demonstrated that the Treaties provide the necessary tools and procedures to 
respond to urgent needs on the ground. That notwithstanding, EU rule of law, 
fundamental rights and better regulation have been the main victims of ‘the 
politics of crisis’ during the 8th legislature in AFSJ policies.  
Fast and emergency-driven policy responses often came at the expense of 
EU better regulation guidelines296 and rule of law and fundamental rights 
standards and Treaty and national constitutional principles. While the critical 
humanitarian situation on the ground may have called for immediate support 
and actions, the Commission should have not lost track of its mandate and the 
longer-term impacts of its policy decisions. The Commission First Vice-
President should have first and foremost ensured that his mandate and 
‘watchdog role’ was rigorously implemented.  
Some policy, legislative and financial instruments proposed or adopted 
by the Commission have not always been adopted following the ordinary 
decision making procedures foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty, nor have they come 
with impact assessments and an evidence-based examination of their added 
value in line with EU Better Regulation commitments. Other Commission 
‘comprehensive assessments’, such as the one conducted on anti-terrorism 
                                                        




72 | CONCLUSIONS AND PRIORITIES 
policies, have not always been accompanied by in-depth evaluations or ‘fitness 
checks’.297  
As Section 3 and Annex I of this book show, the most important priorities 
and developments have related to security or policing-oriented policies over 
other equally central EU policy approaches – such as foreign affairs, 
employment and social affairs, development aid, humanitarian assistance, 
criminal justice or trade, as well as their compliance with fundamental rights 
envisaged in the EUCFR. 
In the name of the crisis and emergency some member state governments 
have also attempted to regain previously lost ground in some JHA-related fields. 
Key political decisions have been taken that fall completely outside the EU 
Treaties in areas already under shared or exclusive Union competence. ‘Crisis’ 
however has meant a ‘new start’ for the intergovernmentalism and nationalism 
which traditionally used to dominate JHA policies before the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.  
The ‘Lisbonisation’ of the AFSJ aimed at facilitating increasing the EU’s 
legitimacy in JHA-related domains by putting the democratic rule of law and 
fundamental rights at the core of European integration and EU inter-
institutional relations and decision-making.298 However, European cooperation 
on AFSJ policies between mid-2014 and end 2018 has been driven by ‘short-
termism’ and ‘crisis-mode’ policymaking in areas of crucial importance for the 
EU. Extra-Treaty and extra-budget cooperation have meant ‘less EU’ in crucial 
EU policies; preventing the Commission from playing its role as envisaged in 
the Treaties, side-lining the European Parliament and excluding judicial control 
by the CJEU.  
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty meant that the monopoly 
previously enjoyed by the JHA Council over AFSJ policies came to an end. The 
AFSJ was considered to be amongst the policy areas where the new Treaties 
generated a more far reaching overhaul. The expansion of the EU ordinary 
legislative procedure and the formalisation of its consent in a larger number of 
areas placed the European Parliament as one of the ‘winners’ of the Lisbon 
Treaty. The European Parliament not only acts as co-legislator in all these policy 
domains, but also becomes co-owner of the EU’s AFSJ political agenda. 
                                                        
297 European Commission, “Better regulation toolbox” (https://ec.europa.eu/info/better-
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298 Sergio Carrera, Nicholas Hernanz and Joanna Parkin (2013), “The ‘Lisbonisation’ of the 
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There were high expectations that this new Commission would work 
more closely with the European Parliament, in relation and response to 
nationalistic demands by some EU member states, during this past legislature.299 
This was also part of the First Vice-President of the Commission’s 
responsibilities. That notwithstanding, some of the most central policy decisions 
justified on the basis of the refugee crisis have expressly or by-design side-lined, 
sometimes all together, the European Parliament’s role.  
The Juncker Commission has often paid too much attention and given too 
great a leverage to some member state governments, and the European Council 
in AFSJ policy fields. The ‘policy salience’ of the migration dossier between 2015 
and 2018 translated into the multiplication of European Council meetings 
dealing with ‘migration’, with JHA Council bodies – i.e. Ministries of Interior of 
EU member states – playing a rather influential role in setting political priorities 
and policies in response to the refugee crisis.  
Many of the crisis-led legal and policy developments have raised 
profound challenges and risks to fundamental rights, particularly in their phases 
of implementation. This is in stark conflict with Vice-President Timmermans’ 
mandate to safeguard the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and his promise 
delivered during his appointment hearing, according to which “We need to 
guarantee that all our actions comply with the Charter. This is the case whether 
we are acting in the context of legislation or otherwise. There must be systematic 
fundamental rights checks and ex post impact assessments at different stages of 
the legislative process”.300  
Similarly, Commissioner Avramopoulos stated in his hearing before the 
Parliament as Commissioner-designate on 30 September 2014 that “my first 
priority will be to do everything possible within my mandate to cope in an 
efficient manner with the migratory pressure at our borders, and fully respecting 
fundamental rights”.301 As illustrated in Section 3 of this book, this promise has 
not been delivered. The main ‘Achilles heel’ of EU responses to the ‘European 
refugee humanitarian crisis’ has been that there has been an unbalanced setting 
and implementation of priorities which have not been EUCFR and Better 
Regulation-proof. 
The Commission has been entrusted with the role and responsibility of 
guarantor of the Treaties, which includes the EU democratic rule of law 
                                                        
299 See Sergio Carrera (2012), The Impact of the Treaty of Lisbon over EU Policies on Migration, 
Asylum and Borders: The Struggles over the Ownership of the Stockholm Programme, in E. 
Guild and P. Minderhoud (eds), The First Decade of EU Migration and Asylum Law, Martinus 
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standards and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights that lie at its foundations. 
Going ‘extra-Treaty’ for strategic political short-term purposes has not only 
posed serious threats to these Treaty standards. It has also contradicted the 
principle of loyal and sincere cooperation in the EU Treaties enshrined in Article 
4.3 TEU, which is a key piece in the EU legal system and inter-institutional 
balance puzzle. This Treaty principle requires member states to facilitate the 
achievement of the Union’s tasks and to refrain from any measure that could 
jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives. It also requires European 
institutions not to undermine these same objectives by short-circuiting the role 
of other institutional actors.  
For instance, the indirect support from the Commission for the adoption 
and implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, or the increasing use of non-
legally binding instruments like ‘readmission arrangements’ and extra-budget 
financial instruments, constitutes an express and conscious ‘policy choice’ to go 
‘extra-Treaty’ and ‘extra-budget’. This kind of decision-making is problematic 
as it effectively means not following the letter of the Treaties and exercising the 
EU legal competence on AFSJ policies, which since the Lisbon Treaty is formally 
shared between the EU and its member states and which requires full 
democratic oversight by the European Parliament and judicial control by the 
Luxembourg Court. 
This book has illustrated how the Juncker Commission has taken 
Europeanisation forward in a number of important policy areas, by either 
adopting new EU legal standards in key domains or by re-designing or creating 
new Community bodies and EU agencies in the JHA arena. However, ‘the politics 
of crisis and emergency’ have also come with very high costs and have not 
benefited this Commission overall. They have translated into two policy making 
logics: first, intergovernmentalism and rule of law backsliding, and second, 
informalisation and exceptionalism, both of which have constituted a serious 
drawback for this Commission and its outputs. These logics have opened the 
door to some EU member state governments and their Ministries of Interior 
attempting to ‘reverse Europeanisation’ and inject ‘less EU’ in areas of shared or 
even exclusive EU competence. Democratic legitimacy, EU rule of law and 
judicial control and the fundamental rights of individuals have been among the 
main losers. 
4.1 Priorities 
4.1.1 Intra-Institutional  
The appointment of a new First-Vice President for rule of law, fundamental 
rights and better regulation was a welcome intra-institutional innovation in the 
Juncker Commission. The office has served to ‘show case’ rule of law challenges 
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arising in several member states. However, a ‘Commission of crisis’, has 
translated into a blurring of roles and portfolios with too much emphasis on 
‘migration’ and ‘justice’ through a security, home affairs or policing approach. There 
has been not one, but many ‘Home Affairs’ or Security Commissioners, which 
has in turn had a direct repercussion on the kind of legal and policy ouputs. This 
has been despite President Juncker expressly declaring that migration and 
asylum should not be mixed with terrorism, and underlying at the G20 Meeting 
on 15 November 2015 the need to delink terrorism and refugee debates in 
Europe, and that people seeking international protection are not criminals or 
potential terrorists.302  
The next Commission intra-institutional structure should therefore give 
priority to the following: the role of Vice-President should not be that of ‘First 
Vice-President’, as it has exposed this role and made it vulnerable to high-level 
politics, making it very difficult to maintain the course of action originally 
envisaged in the mandate. The current setting of having three different 
Commissioners responsible for ‘Justice’, ‘Home Affairs, Migration and 
Citizenship’ and ‘Security Union’, under the supervision of a Vice-President on 
Rule of Law, EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Better Regulation, has been 
however a welcome development and should be maintained in the next 
Commission.  
As proposed by previous CEPS research,303 the portfolios of each of the 
three Commissioners could be fine-tuned and clarified as follows: first, one 
Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, who would be 
responsible for criminal justice cooperation, European Citizenship and 
fundamental rights portfolios (Chapter 4 TFEU, Arts. 82-86; Part II TFEU, Arts. 
18-25); second, another Commissioner on Schengen, Migration and Asylum 
(Chapter 2 TFEU, Arts. 77-89); and third, a Commissioner for Security, who 
would be responsible for the fight against terrorism and criminality, in 
particular ‘police cooperation’, i.e. prevention, detection and investigation of 
crimes (Chapter 5 TFEU, Arts. 87- 89). This division of responsibilities would 
avoid a mixing of Schengen, migration and asylum with crime and terrorism 
policies. Each of these Commissioners would ideally have their own DG; 
otherwise, at a minimum, the current division between DG JUST and DG HOME 
should be continued. 
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4.1.2 Substantive or Thematic  
Rule of Law 
A first priority should be the setting up a new EU Periodic Review or Mechanism 
on Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights (DRF) covering all EU 
member states. The EU DRF Periodic Review/Mechanism would be based on a 
regular and independent examination of all relevant existing international and 
European sources of evidence on compliance with EU Treaty values.304 This 
should go hand-in-hand with establishing a new ‘EU Rule of Law Commission 
or Group’305 composed of high-level experts and experienced practitioners that 
would have the competence to impartially assess the qualitative findings by 
thematic area substantiating the existence of a systemic risk, threats or 
‘generalised deficiency’ of the rule of law, and their wider implications for EU-
specific policies and financial instruments in the Union legal system.306  
The DRF would be part of a wider ‘EU Rule of Law Toolbox’ bringing the 
new mechanism together with all currently existing legal, policy and funding 
instruments monitoring and assessing member state compliance with Art. 2 TEU 
principles and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The next Commission 
should additionally implement ‘rule of law infringement procedures’, 
presenting both an accelerated/fast track and freezing component,307 which 
would bundle cases against a member state presenting similar basic rule of law 
issues. The evidence emerging from the DRF mechanism would be central in 
substantiating the existence of ‘systematic’ rule of law issues, which could also 
be directly brought by the DRF Commission or Group before the Luxembourg 
Court, so as not to leave all room for discretion with the European Commission.  
A Migration and Asylum Union 
Another priority should be adopting and implementing a ‘Migration and Asylum 
Union’ based on more intra-EU institutional solidarity and supervision.308 All 
                                                        
304 Carrera and Bard (2018), op.cit. 
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EU member states should fully comply with their current legal obligations under 
the Schengen regime and immediately suspend unlawful international border 
controls. The use of border walls and fences at Schengen external borders should 
be rigorously tested against EU rules and values, and illegal practices by certain 
member state governments such as ‘push backs’ and ‘hot returns’ at external 
borders should be stopped immediately.  
The envisaged proposal for a new mandate of EASO and its 
transformation into a fully operational EU Asylum Agency should also become 
a key priority. The new Agency should be entrusted with coordinating and 
applying a new model for distributing responsibility for processing asylum 
applications and supervising member states in carrying out that responsibility. 
The allocation model would follow the distribution key proposed by the 
European Parliament (see Section 3.2 of this book), in close cooperation with the 
UNHCR and civil society organisations and under a clear EU and domestic legal 
framework. This should go hand-in-hand with a more robust legal and judicial 
accountability framework ensuring effective remedies for asylum applicants 
interviewed by or receiving negative asylum decisions from the current and new 
EASO+ Agency. 
The new proposal for revising the Frontex (European Border and Coast 
Guard) mandate presents further potential for institutional solidarity and the 
development of a ‘professional culture of border and coast guards’ across the 
EU. The EBCG could play a more active role in the promotion, evaluation and 
daily implementation of EU border standards laid down in the Schengen 
Borders Code (SBC), which already include the practical delivery of key 
administrative guarantees and fundamental rights protections. 
However, it also comes with important gaps and risks. The EBCG should 
develop its Search and Rescue (SAR) operational functions and ensure a 
Mediterranean-wide SAR operation. In practice, this would mean that each 
person disembarking from a Frontex EBCG SAR operation would be taken 
directly into the scope of application and mandate of the new EU Asylum 
Agency and a new distribution key model.309 The new Frontex should also go 
hand-in-hand with establishing an independent complaints mechanism and an 
EU border monitor (not dependent on Frontex) so as to further strengthen 
fundamental rights protection in all its activities and responsibilities. The 
monitor, which could be part of the European Ombudsman’s office, would be 
responsible for evaluating and handling cases of alleged mistreatment and 
fundamental rights violation in the context of border control and surveillance 
operations. 
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The current EU asylum acquis already provides a robust transnational 
legal framework of Union standards implying clear obligations for all 
participating EU member states. The next Commission should invest renewed 
efforts – which should go hand-in-hand with increased EU financial support – 
in enforcing timely and correct implementation and practical delivery of these 
common standards on the ground by all EU member states and relevant national 
authorities. Asylum should be disentangled from security predicaments and 
agendas. As underlined by the 1999 Tampere Programme,310 and as now 
enshrined in Art. 18 EUCFR, a key priority should be to uphold the absolute 
respect of the right to seek asylum in the Union. Nobody should be sent back to 
persecution, torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, in violation of the 
principle of non-refoulement.  
Moreover, the next Commission should make sure to complement the new 
mandate of the EU Asylum Agency with a new systematic monitoring or 
evaluation mechanism in the area of asylum in light of Article 70 TFEU. This 
should be complemented with further steps in building a truly Common 
European Asylum System, and playing a key role in the faithful implementation 
of the United Nations (UN) Global Compact on Refugees.311 The priorities in this 
policy area identified by the 1999 Tampere Programme – the alignment of rules 
on mutual recognition of asylum decisions and a uniform status for those 
granted asylum valid throughout the Union – remain at present incomplete.312 
As highlighted by the 2015 European Agenda on Migration, the next 
Commission should give particular attention to delivering these objectives, 
developing common EU legal standards on mutual recognition of positive 
asylum decisions taken by another member state and “establishing a single 
asylum decision process so as to guarantee equal treatment of asylum seekers 
throughout the EU”.313 
As regards ‘migration’, the next Commission should give priority to 
developing a fair EU agenda facilitating legal channels for migration, and 
implementing the UN Global Compact on Migration.314 Such an agenda should 
                                                        
310 Refer to Paragraph 13 of the Tampere Programme, which stated that “ 
311 United Nations, Global Compact on Refugees, Final Draft, 24 June 2018 
(https://www.un.org/pga/72/wp-content/uploads/sites/51/2018/07/Global-Compact-
on-Refugees.pdf). 
312 Refer to paragraph 14 of the 1999 Tampere Programme. 
313 See page 17 of the European Agenda on Migration. 
314 UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, Final Draft, 11 July 2018 
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be firmly rooted in existing international, regional and EU human rights and 
labour standards and the principles laid down in EU Treaties and national 
constitutions.  
Back in 2010, the European Commission advanced the idea of adopting an 
‘Immigration Code’.315 As recommended by CEPS research,316 the adoption of 
an EU immigration code – incorporating all existing sectorial EU directives, and 
providing a uniform level of rights to third-country workers – would be a 
welcome step forward. This would move towards the implementation of the 
1999 Tampere Programme priority calling for the need to align “national 
legislations on the conditions of admission and residence of third country 
nationals”317 and put into practice the Lisbon Treaty goal of developing a 
common immigration policy which is “fair towards third-country nationals”.318  
The next Commission should also revise the current EU visa waiver 
regime to include a common EU approach on humanitarian visas that would not 
be dependent on third-country cooperation on readmission. Such an approach 
would declassify or suspend EU visa requirements for individuals holding the 
nationality of top refugee-generating countries according to UNCHR and 
Eurostat data.319 The establishment of common EU visa issuing offices in third 
countries could be revisited, again in line with the call given by the Tampere 
Programme.320  
Furthermore, the current EU legal framework on migrant smuggling 
should be fully ‘Lisbonised’ and amended so as to ensure full compliance with 
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international human rights standards and de-criminalise the provision of 
humanitarian assistance to asylum seekers and irregular immigrants by civil 
society, volunteers and citizens.  
A principled and trust-based Security Union 
The EU should construct and progressively develop a principled and trust-based 
policy approach to countering terrorism. This policy approach should start with 
an evaluation (fitness check) and regular reappraisal of the effectiveness, 
efficiency and fundamental rights compliance of current and near future EU 
policies and their priorities, particularly those related to information exchange. 
In particular, the EU can bring value added by investing more action in 
furthering EU coordination of traditional policing and criminal justice 
cooperation in fighting terrorism.321 
The overall guiding principle in EU security measures should be less data 
retention and processing, and better and more accurate use of data that meets the 
quality standards of evidence in criminal judicial proceedings.322 The goal 
established by the European Agenda on Security calling for “better information 
exchange” in full compliance with fundamental rights has not been 
accomplished.323 The fundamental rights impact of the interoperability 
proposals – including privacy, non-discrimination and effective remedies – 
should be independently re-examined and thoroughly addressed. The European 
Production and Preservation Order (EPO) proposals should be substantially 
revised and improved so as to: first, duly ensure that electronic data will always 
meet the standards of ‘evidence’ in criminal justice procedures; and second, 
ensure independent judicial scrutiny and effective remedies both in the issuing 
and executing EU member states.  
The EU should set up an EU-wide requests and complaints mechanism, 
independent from the eu-LISA agency, allowing for data subjects to request 
access, correct and delete data, as well as lodge complaints against data misuses 
in the scope of current and future EU databases. Specific attention should be 
given to strengthening the provision of information to data subjects and 
guaranteeing effective access to these complaints by affected EU citizens as well 
as third-country nationals and asylum seekers. A common EU definition of 
‘competent national authorities’ having access to AFSJ databases should be 
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adopted so as to ensure the principle of purpose limitation is upheld and 
accessibility is restricted to legitimate domestic actors. 
A European agenda on criminal justice and fundamental rights  
The next Commission should develop a European agenda on justice and give 
priority to effective implementation of mutual recognition in criminal matters 
instruments, starting with the European Arrest Warrant. It could also focus on 
ensuring the effective domestic transposition and use of the EIO across all 
relevant member states. It is recommended to let this EU mutual recognition tool 
grow first before the EPO is adopted. This priority should go hand-in-hand with 
greater financial investment and resources for ensuring domestic transposition 
and use of EIOs in light of the needs of national judges, prosecutors and defence 
lawyers.  
This should also be accompanied by a more robust EU framework on 
suspects’ rights in criminal proceedings, starting by filling up current gaps (e.g. 
pre-trial detentions or witness protections) and then carrying out a ‘Fitness 
Check’ on the entire EU acquis on suspects’ rights in EU criminal justice 
cooperation. Moreover, the new Commission should develop common EU legal 
standards preventing the use of unlawful or illegally accessed or processed 
information in criminal investigations, so that it should not be admissible before 
any national or Union court throughout the EU. 
Any expansion of the areas of competence of the EPPO should be coupled 
with effective and supranational judicial scrutiny by the CJEU. In line with the 
Lisbon Treaty, the next Commission should make all efforts to ensure that the 
EPPO moves from ‘enhanced cooperation’ to a fully EU body with all relevant 
EU member states participating in its mandate and activities. Special attention 
should be also given to bring the EPPO under full judicial control by the 
Luxembourg Court and developing EU-wide standards for whistle-blower 
protection with the establishment of a direct complaints mechanism before the 
EPPO. 
The EU’s contribution to cross-border operational cooperation in the area 
of cross-border crime fighting hints at some positive transformative effects. 
Experiences like those of the Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) of judicial 
authorities, which were also promoted by the 1999 Tampere Programme,324 
under the joint coordination of EU agencies Europol and Eurojust, call for careful 
examination and scrutiny, as they have the potential to play a key role in 
developing mutual trust and cooperation among law enforcement authorities of 
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EU member states. 325 JITs should facilitate criminal justice investigations rather 
than focusing on ‘intelligence’ gathering.  
A full implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the 
Union’s accession to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) – 
following the call envisaged in Art.6.2 TEU – should be at the very top of the 
new Commission’s priorities. The EU is now a regional and international 
standard-setter regarding fundamental rights such as those related to privacy 
and data protection. EU standards should be preserved, promoted and 
rigorously monitored in the adoption and implementation of every legal and 
policy instrument developing cooperation with third countries. For example, 
frameworks of cooperation on data transfers with non-EU countries should 
provide an equivalent level of protection and be fully compliant with 
Luxembourg Court benchmarks.  
EU AFSJ cooperation: legitimation, credibility and trust  
The next European Commission should focus on making rigorous use of the 
legal acts and templates of European cooperation envisaged in the Lisbon Treaty 
(which comprises both the TEU and the TFEU). The increasing recourse to extra-
Treaty and extra-budget instruments during the Juncker Commission has not 
well served its role as ‘guarantor of the Treaties’. It has also posed profound 
challenges to good administration, democratic accountability and judicial 
control of the policy developments in areas of huge importance for the Union’s 
legitimation. EU policy responses need to move from a home affairs-centric 
focus towards a ‘multi-sector policy approach’ in order to guarantee a balanced 
setting of priorities across all relevant policy sectors. 
The new upcoming period of inter-institutional renewal should shift out 
of ‘crisis mode’ and return the ‘normal’ course of action in European integration 
to the basis of the mandate provided in the EU Treaties. The next Commission 
should dedicate all its efforts to designing and implementing a principled justice, 
freedom and security agenda in its strategic policy guidebook. It is by 
unequivocally placing EU founding principles first – rule of law, fundamental 
rights and democracy – and systematically enforcing and delivering them in 
daily practice, that the legitimation and credibility of European integration may 
be guaranteed in the short and longer term. 
                                                        
325 Carrera et al. (2017), op.cit. 
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This table offers an overview of AFSJ developments during the Junker Commission (mid-2014 to December 2018), and legal acts proposed by the 
Barroso Commission discussed or adopted during this term. Judicial cooperation in civil matters falls outside the scope of the Table. 




Schengen and Securing External Borders (corresponding with Section 3.1 of this Report) 
ID Cards and Residence 
Documents  
Proposal for a Regulation on strengthening the security 
of identity cards of Union citizens and of residence 
documents issued to Union citizens and their family 





of Certain Public 
Documents  
 Regulation (EU) 2016/1191 of 6 July 2016 on 
promoting the free movement of citizens by 
simplifying the requirements for presenting 
certain public documents in the European Union. 




Border Control at 
Internal Borders 
Proposal for a Regulation as regards the rules applicable 
to the temporary reintroduction of border control at 
internal borders, COM(2017) 571. 27.9.2017. 
 
 
European Border And 
Coast Guard (EBCG) – 
Revision FRONTEX  
 Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of 14 September 2016 
on the European Border and Coast Guard. OJ L 
251, 16.9.2016. 
 
EBCG  Proposal for a Regulation on EBCG, COM(2018) 631. 
12.9.2018. 
  
Schengen Borders Code 
(Anti-Terrorism 
Measures) 
 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of 9 March 2016 on a 
Union Code on the rules governing the movement 
of persons across borders (Schengen Borders 
Code). OJ L 77, 23.3.2016. 
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Asylum and Refugees (Section 3.2) 
EASO  Proposal for a Regulation on the European Union 
Agency for Asylum and repealing Regulation (EU) No 
439/2010 COM/2016/0271 final. 4.5.2016. 
 
 
EASO  Amended proposal for a Regulation on the European 
Union Agency for Asylum and repealing Regulation 





Proposal for a Regulation establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State 
responsible for examining an application for 
international protection lodged in one of the Member 
States by a third-country national or a stateless person 





Proposal for a Regulation establishing a common 
procedure for international protection in the Union. 
COM/2016/0467 final. 13.7.2016.  
 
 
Qualifications Directive Proposal for a Regulation on standards for the 
qualification of third-country nationals or stateless 
persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a 
uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for 
subsidiary protection and for the content of the 





Proposal for a Directive laying down standards for the 
reception of applicants for international protection 





Proposal for a Directive on common standards and 
procedures in Member States for returning illegally 






Proposal for a Regulation establishing a crisis relocation 
mechanism and amending Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 
  
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of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms 
for determining the Member State responsible for 
examining an application for international protection 
lodged in one of the Member States by a third country 




Proposal for a Regulation establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State 
responsible for examining an application for international 
protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-
country national or a stateless person (recast). COM(2016) 
270 final. 4.5.2016. 
 
 
European List of Safe 
Countries of Origin 
Proposal for a Regulation establishing an EU common list 
of safe countries of origin for the purposes of Directive 
2013/32/EU on common procedures for granting and 




Asylum and Migration 
Fund 
Proposal for a Regulation establishing the Asylum and 
Migration Fund. COM/2018/471 final. 12.6.2018. 
  
Legal Immigration (Section 3.3) 
Revision Blue Card 
Directive 
Proposal for a Directive on the conditions of entry and 
residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of 




Visa Policy Package – 
Recast Visa Code  
Proposal for a Regulation on the Union Code on Visas 
(Visa Code) (recast). COM/2014/0164 final. 1.4.2014. 
 Withdrawn 
(4.7.2018) 
Visa Policy Package – 
Touring Visa 
Proposal for a Regulation establishing a touring visa. 
COM/2014/0163 final. 1.4.2014.  
 Withdrawn 
(4.7.2018) 
Revision of the Visa 
Code 
Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 
810/2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa 
Code). COM/2018/0252 final. 14.3.2018. 
 
 
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Directive on Students 
and Researchers 
 Directive (EU) 2016/801 of 11 May 2016 on the 
conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purposes of research, studies, 
training, voluntary service, pupil exchange 
schemes or educational projects and au pairing. OJ 
L 132, 21.5.2016. 
 
Revision of the Uniform 
Format for Visas 
 Regulation (EU) 2017/1370 of 4 July 2017 
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1683/95 
laying down a uniform format for visas. OJ L 198, 
28.7.2017. 
 
Global Compact for 
Safe, Orderly and 
Regular Migration in 
the area of immigration 
policy 
Proposal for a Council Decision authorising the 
Commission to approve, on behalf of the Union, the 
Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration 




Irregular Entries and Third Country Cooperation on Expulsions (Section 3.4) 
Revision of the 
Immigration Liaison 
Officers Regulation 
Proposal for a Regulation on the creation of a European 
network of immigration liaison officers (recast). 




Document for the 
Return of Irregular 
Migrants 
 Regulation (EU) 2016/1953 of 26 October 2016 on 
the establishment of a European travel document 
for the return of illegally staying third-country 
nationals. OJ L 311, 17.11.2016. 
 
Recast of the Return 
Directive 
Proposal for a Directive on common standards and 
procedures in Member States for returning illegally 






Admission scheme with 
Turkey 
 
 Commission Recommendation of 15.12.2015 for a 
voluntary humanitarian admission scheme with 
Turkey. C(2015) 9490.   
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Facility for Refugees in 
Turkey 
 Commission Decision of 10.11.2016 on the Facility 
for Refugees in Turkey amending Commission 
Decision C(2015) 9500. 24.11.2015.  
 
 Commission Decision of 18.4.2017 on the Facility 
for Refugees in Turkey amending Commission 
Decision C(2015) 9500 of 24 November 2015 
(2017/C 122/04). 
 
 Commission Decision of 14.3.2018 on the Facility for 
Refugees in Turkey amending Commission Decision 
C(2015)9500 as regards the contribution to the 
Facility for Refugees in Turkey. C(2018) 1500 final.  
 
 Commission Decision of 24.7.2018 on the Facility 
for Refugees in Turkey amending Commission 
Decision C(2015)9500 as regards the contribution 
to the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. C(2018) 4959 
final. 
 
Criminal Justice and Police Cooperation (Section 3.5) 
Presumption of 
Innocence - Procedural 
Rights in Criminal 
Proceedings 
 Directive 2016/343 of 9 March 2016 on the 
strengthening of certain aspects of the 
presumption of innocence and of the right to be 
present at the trial in criminal proceedings. OJ L 
65, 11.3.2016. 
Based on the European Commission package of 
proposals of November 2013. 
 
Legal Aid - Procedural 
Rights of Accused 
Persons in Criminal 
Proceedings 
 Directive (EU) 2016/1919 of 26 October 2016 on 
legal aid for suspects and accused persons in 
criminal proceedings and for requested persons in 
European arrest warrant proceedings. OJ L 297, 
4.11.2016. 
Based on the European Commission package of 
proposals of November 2013. 
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Review of the 
Framework Decision on 
Terrorism 
 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of 15 March 2017 on 
combating terrorism and replacing Council 
Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and 
amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA. OJ L 
88, 31.3.2017. 
 
Revision of the 
Directive on 
Acquisition and 
Possession of Weapons 
 Directive (EU) 2017/853 of 17 May 2017 amending 
Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the 





(AML) – Countering 
Terrorist Financing 
 Directive (EU) 2015/849 of 20 May 2015 on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for 
the purposes of money laundering or terrorist 
financing. OJ L 141, 5.6.2015. 
 
Revision of the Anti-
Money Laundering 
Directive (AML) – 
Countering Terrorist 
Financing 
 Directive (EU) 2018/843 of 30 May 2018 amending 
Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the 
use of the financial system for the purposes of 
money laundering or terrorist financing. OJ L 156, 
19.6.2018. 
 
EU Accession to the 






Proposal for a Council Decision on the signing, on behalf 
of the European Union, of the Council of Europe 
Convention on preventing and combating violence 




Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion, by the 
European Union, of the Council of Europe Convention on 
preventing and combating violence against women and 
domestic violence. COM/2016/0109 final. 4.3.2016. 
  
Initiatives to Facilitate 
Cross-Border Access to 
and Use of Financial Data 
by Law Enforcement 
Authorities 
Proposal for a Directive laying down rules facilitating the 
use of financial and other information for the prevention, 
detection, investigation or prosecution of certain criminal 
offences. COM/2018/213 final. 17.4.2018. 
 
 
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Revision of the 
Regulation on 
Marketing and Use of 
Explosive Precursors 
Proposal for a Regulation on the marketing and use of 




and Preservation Orders 
for Electronic Evidence 
in Criminal Matters 
Proposal for a Regulation on European Production and 
Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal 
matters. COM/2018/225 final. 17.4.2018. 
 
 
Appointment of Legal 
Representatives for the 
Purpose of Gathering 
Evidence in Criminal 
Proceedings 
Proposal for a Directive laying down harmonised rules on 
the appointment of legal representatives for the purpose 
of gathering evidence in criminal proceedings 







Proposal for a Regulation on preventing the 
dissemination of terrorist content online. COM/2018/640 
final. 12.9.2018.  
 
 
Revision of CEPOL  Regulation (EU) 2015/2219 of 25 November 2015 
on the European Union Agency for Law 




for Children Suspected 
or Accused 
 Directive (EU) 2016/800 of 11 May 2016 on 
procedural safeguards for children who are 
suspects or accused persons in criminal 
proceedings. OJ L 132, 21.5.2016. 
 
Revision of EUROPOL  Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of 11 May 2016 on the 
European Union Agency for Law Enforcement 
Cooperation (Europol). OJ L 135, 24.5.2016. 
 
Insolvency Proceedings  Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of 20 May 2015 on 
insolvency proceedings. OJ L 141, 5.6.2015. 
 
 
112 | ANNEX 
Mutual Recognition of 
Freezing and 
Confiscation Orders 
 Regulation (EU) 2018/1805 of 14 November 2018 
on the mutual recognition of freezing orders and 
confiscation orders. OJ L 303, 28.11.2018. 
 
Controls on Cash 
Entering or Leaving the 
Union 
 Pending publication in EU Official Journal  
Revision of eu-LISA  Regulation (EU) 2018/1726 of 14 November 2018 
on the European Union Agency for the 
Operational Management of Large-Scale IT 
Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice (eu-LISA). OJ L 295, 21.11.2018. 
 
Revision of EUROJUST  Regulation (EU) 2018/1727 of 14 November 2018 
on the European Union Agency for Criminal 






 Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 
2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the 
establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office (‘the EPPO’). OJ L 283, 31.10.2017. Proposal 
submitted by the former Commission in 2013. 
 
Money laundering   Pending publication in EU Official Journal  
Fraud and 
Counterfeiting of non-
Cash Means of 
Payments 
Proposal for a Directive on combating fraud and 
counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment 
COM/2017/0489 final. 13.9.2017. 
 
 
Interoperability and information systems (Section 3.5.4) 
Revision of the 
Schengen Information 
System in the Field of 
Police Cooperation and 
Judicial Cooperation in 
Criminal Matters 
 Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 of 28 November 2018 
on the establishment, operation and use of the 
Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of 
police cooperation and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters. OJ L 312, 7.12.2018. 
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Revision of the 
Schengen Information 
System in the field of 
Border Checks 
 Regulation (EU) 2018/1861 of 28 November 2018 
on the establishment, operation and use of the 
Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of 
border checks. OJ L 312, 7.12.2018. 
 
Revision of the Schengen 
Information System for 
the Return of Illegally 
Staying Third-Country 
Nationals 
 Regulation (EU) 2018/1860 of 28 November 2018 
on the use of the Schengen Information System for 
the return of illegally staying third-country 
nationals. OJ L 312, 7.12.2018. 
 




Proposal for a Directive amending Council Framework 
Decision 2009/315/JHA, as regards the exchange of 
information on third country nationals and as regards the 
European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS). 
COM/2016/07 final. 19.1.2016. 
 
 
New Regulation on the 
Visa Information 
System (VIS) 




EU Passenger Name 
Record 
 Directive (EU) 2016/681 of 27 April 2016 on the 
use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the 
prevention, detection, investigation and 
prosecution of terrorist offences and serious 
crime. OJ L 119, 4.5.2016. 
 
Interoperability 
Between EU Information 
Systems in the Field of 
Borders and Visa 
Proposal for a regulation on establishing a 
framework for interoperability between EU information 






Systems on Police and 
Judicial Cooperation, 
Asylum and Migration 
Proposal for a regulation on establishing a framework for 
interoperability between EU information systems (police 
and judicial cooperation, asylum and migration). 
COM/2018/480 final. 13.6.2018. 
 
 





 Regulation (EU) 2018/1240 of 12 September 2018 
establishing a European Travel Information and 
Authorisation System (ETIAS). OJ L 236, 
19.9.2018. 
 
Entry/Exit System (2013 
Smart Borders Package 
– EES) 
Proposal for a Regulation establishing an Entry/Exit 
System (EES) to register entry and exit data of third 
country nationals crossing the external borders of the 
Member States of the European Union. COM/2013/095 
final. 28.2.2013. Proposed by the former Commission. 
 
Withdrawn 
Entry/Exit System (2013 
Smart Borders Package 
– RTP) 
Proposal for a Regulation establishing a Registered 
Traveller Programme, COM/2013/097 final. 28.2.2013. 
Proposed by the former Commission. 
 Withdrawn 
(17.11.2016) 
Entry/Exit System (2016 
Smart Borders Package) 
 Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 of 30 November 2017 
establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to 
register entry and exit data and refusal of entry 
data of third-country nationals crossing the 
external borders of the Member States and 
determining the conditions for access to the EES 
for law enforcement purposes. OJ L 327, 9.12.2017 
 
Recast of the 
EURODAC  
Proposal for a Regulation on the establishment of 
‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of fingerprints for the 
effective application of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, for 
identifying an illegally staying third-country national or 
stateless person and on requests for the comparison with 
Eurodac data by Member States’ law enforcement 
authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes 
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Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights (Section 3.6) 
Anti-Discrimination 
Directive 
Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the 
principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation. COM/2008/0426 final. 2.7.2018. Proposal 
presented in 2008 by previous Commission.  
 
 
EU Accession to the 
ECHR 
Protocol (no 8) relating to article 6(2) of the treaty on 
European Union on the accession of the Union to the 
European Convention on the Protection of Human rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. OJ C 202, 7.6.2016. Draft 
Accession Agreement of 5 April 2013. 
 
 
General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) 
 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data (General Data Protection 
Regulation). OJ L 119, 4.5.2016. 
 
Verification Procedure 
Related to Infringements 
of Personal Data in the 
Context of the European 
Parliament Elections 
Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation (EU, 
Euratom) No 1141/2014 as regards a verification 
procedure related to infringements of rules on the protection 
of personal data in the context of elections to the European 





Proposal for a Directive on the protection of persons 




Data Protection – Police 
Directive 
 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data by competent authorities 
for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, 
detection or prosecution of criminal offences or 
the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free 
movement of such data. OJ L 119, 4.5.2016.  
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Multiannual 
Framework for the 
European Union 
Agency for 
Fundamental Rights for 
2018-2022 
 Council Decision (EU) 2017/2269 of 7 December 
2017 establishing a Multiannual Framework for 
the European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights for 2018–2022. OJ L 326, 9.12.2017. 
 
Protection of the 
Union’s Financial 
Interests (PIF Directive) 
 Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of 5 July 2017 on the 
fight against fraud to the Union’s financial 
interests by means of criminal law. OJ L 198, 
28.7.2017 
 
Protection of Individuals 
with regard to the 
Processing of Personal 
Data by the Union 
Institutions, Bodies, 
Offices and Agencies 
and on the Free 
Movement of such Data 
 Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of 23 October 2018 on 
the protection of natural persons with regard to 
the processing of personal data by the Union 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on 




European nature and 
efficient conduct of the 
2019 elections to the 
European Parliament 
 Commission Recommendation of 14.2.2018 on 
enhancing the European nature and efficient 
conduct of the 2019 elections to the European 
Parliament. C(2018) 900 final.  
 
Protection of the Union’s 
budget in case of 
generalised deficiencies 
as regards the rule of law 
in the Member States 
Proposal for a Regulation on the protection of the Union’s 
budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the 
rule of law in the Member States. 2.5.2018 COM(2018) 324. 
 
 
  
